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1. INTRODUCTION 
AND BACKGROUND
This Review provides an update, for the EU-27, to the 
report on undeclared work that was published in the EEO 
Review: Autumn 2004 
www.eu-employment-observatory.net/en/reviews 
The Review concentrates on the following aspects:
  changes in the prevalence of undeclared work;
  the impact of minimum wages;
  the impact of the taxation and social security    
regimes; and
  measures aimed at tackling undeclared work.
The Review is based on articles submitted by the SYSDEM 
experts, as part of the work of the European Employment 
Observatory, in Spring 2007. The original articles are avail-
able in English on the EEO website 
www.eu-employment-observatory.net/en/reviews 
An appendix to this Review summarises the national 
articles by country.
Forthcoming European Commission Communication on 
Undeclared Work (Autumn 2007)
These articles have contributed to the recent debate 
about the prevalence and persistence of undeclared work 
led by the European Commission, the results of which are 
forthcoming in the 2007 Commission Communication on 
Undeclared Work. 
Tackling undeclared work is integrated into the European 
Employment Strategy, Guideline 21 under the broad ob-
jective of Improving the Adaptability of Workers and En-
terprises (Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines 
for the employment for the Member States):
Europe needs to improve its capacity to anticipate, trig-
ger and absorb economic and social change. This requires 
employment-friendly labour costs, modern forms of work 
organisation and well-functioning labour markets allow-
ing more ﬂ  exibility combined with employment security to 
meet the needs of companies and workers. This should also 
contribute to preventing the emergence of segmented la-
bour markets and reducing undeclared work.
Previous European Commission Communication (1989) 
The 1989 Communication launched a debate on the 
causes of undeclared work and the policy options for 
combating it. The debate focused on two main concerns. 
First, a discussion was needed to identify correctly the 
causes and extent of the problem. Second, the aim was to 
regard combating undeclared work as part of the overall 
employment strategy (COM (98) – 219).
Previous European Commission Research (2004)
The background to the European Commission’s concerns 
about undeclared work in the enlarged EU is manifest 
in the 1998 Commission Communication on Undeclared 
Work (COM (98) 219 ﬁ  nal) and the study Undeclared 
Work in an Enlarged European Union, Renooy et al., 2004. 
(See http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/
employment_analysis/work/undecl_work_ﬁ  nal_en.pdf).
The principal aims of the research were to clarify deﬁ  -
nitions, measurement methods, estimated size, good 
practices and the gender dimension of undeclared work. 
In summary the study concluded that the information 
on the size and structure of undeclared work collected 
through reliable methods was sparse. 
For the EU-15 the conclusion was that undeclared work 
in most Member States was rather modest in extent with 
OVERVIEW OF SYSDEM EXPERTS’ NATIONAL UPDATE ARTICLES ON 
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￿
estimates far below 5% of GDP, the exceptions be-
ing southern European countries like Italy and Greece. 
Participation in undeclared work was dominated by 
men between 25 and 45 years of age, generally skilled 
workers and often with a regular job. The sector with a 
highest incidence of informal work across the EU was the 
construction sector followed by agriculture (in Germany), 
hotel and restaurant sectors and personal and domestic 
services. 
For the new Member States and the then (2004) candi-
date countries, regarding the estimated scale of unde-
clared work, the range was from 8% to 22% of GDP. The 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia were in the lowest 
band; Bulgaria and Romania were in the highest band; 
and Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia were 
in the middle band. The following were interesting char-
acteristics of undeclared work in Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries:
  the importance of retailing and the hotel and 
restaurant sectors;
   the presence of a subsistence economy with a focus 
on agriculture, more typical of developing countries;
  the relative high importance of professional services;
  the relative low incidence of the informal economy 
in manufacturing.
One of the most important factors in combating unde-
clared work in these countries was reported as the gen-
eral success and stability of economic development, po-
litical stability, integration in Western markets (including 
the presence of foreign capital) and the liberalisation of 
foreign trade. 
Women participated less in undeclared work than men 
overall in the Member States and candidate countries. 
However the working conditions of women in unde-
clared work overall were less favourable than those of 
men. Women tended to be employed in less autonomous 
jobs, earned less and were motivated to work informally 
by economic necessity. Men tended to earn extra cash on 
the side through undeclared work.
2. THE PREVALENCE 
OF UNDECLARED WORK
The 2004 European Employment Observatory Review in-
dicated that the prevalence of undeclared work ranged 
from 1.5% to 30% of GDP, with the greatest prevalence 
amongst the (then) candidate countries and the new 
Member States.1 This pattern has not changed, although 
it needs to be acknowledged that new ofﬁ  cial  data 
(i.e. since 2004) are only available for a small number of 
countries. 
Table 1 summarises the latest position on prevalence, in 
comparison with that noted in 2004. There is evidence 
of a decline in six countries, four of which are new Mem-
ber States. The decreases in Denmark, Estonia, Italy and 
Slovakia are fairly small. In the EU-15 the decrease may 
be linked with government measures (e.g. information 
campaign in Denmark, stronger control measures), where-
as in the new Member States, the main factor is seen in the 
pace of job creation and the emergence of shortages.
Six other countries show increases in the prevalence of 
undeclared work; this includes Germany and Sweden, 
although their prevalence rates remain relatively low. 
Changes in direct and indirect taxation in Germany have, 
it seems, had an impact on undeclared work, whilst in 
Sweden attitudes toward tax evasion appear to have re-
laxed and may be accounting for much of the change. In 
Spain there has been a moderate increase, with no spe-
ciﬁ  c cause identiﬁ  able, although it is interesting to note 
that the increase would probably have been much greater 
without the amnesty for illegal migrant workers in 2005.
The other countries showing an increase in prevalence are 
new Member States – Bulgaria and Malta.  In Bulgaria and 
Malta, the increases seem to be linked with general in-
creases in the size of the informal economy. 
There is no apparent change in prevalence in 16 countries. 
For these countries, there are no speciﬁ  c, new ofﬁ  cial data 
on undeclared work. However, at the same time there are 
no indications from ‘indirect’ evidence (e.g. numbers of 
breaches of the law, or anecdotal evidence) of any chang-
es in prevalence.
(1)   The 2004 Report included data on Turkey and Norway; these countries are not included in this update.7
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Country   Comments
Decreases in the prevalence of undeclared work
Denmark A regular survey shows continued, moderate decreases since 2001 (from a peak of 3.8% of GDP in 2001, to 3.0% in 2005). 
There is some evidence that this overall decrease may be hiding an increase of prevalence amongst women (primarily as a 
result of the strong controls exercised in the male-dominated construction sector).
Estonia There is evidence that the prevalence of undeclared work has decreased slightly (to around 7-8% of GDP, from 8-9% in 2001). 
It is still high in relation to the EU-15 but low in comparison with other new Member States.
Italy Estimates of prevalence, based on national accounts, show a reduction from 7.6% of GDP in 2000 to 6.4% in 2006. However, 
this reduction has to be seen in the context of an amnesty in 2002 for illegal migrant workers (almost 650,000 workers).
Lithuania Undeclared work has decreased from about 8% to 6% of the total employed. This appears to be linked to shortages of labour 
(as a result of economic growth and emigration since 2003/4).
Poland The prevalence is currently regarded as being around 12-15% of GDP. 
This is a decrease from previous estimates (in 2003) of 14-25%; ﬁ  gures for the percentage of the population engaged in 
undeclared work show similar decreases.
Slovakia Moderate decreases in the prevalence.
Increases in the prevalence of undeclared work
Bulgaria There are no data based on national accounts, but survey data indicate that the grey economy has been increasing markedly 
since 2004. It is concluded therefore, that undeclared work itself is likely to have been increasing.
Germany Data show that undeclared work was declining until 2006, but it is expected to increase by 1%. This is a result of changes in 
taxation.
Spain Figures show an increase from 2003 to 2006 (measured by number of workers undertaking undeclared work, up from 11.6% 
to 12.3%). However, there appears to have been a decrease in the prevalence in construction and agriculture, as a result of the 
regularisation of immigrant workers’ status in 2005.
Malta Undeclared work is regarded as increasing over the last few years. However, ﬁ  gures relate to undeclared work and illegal work 
(the underground economy is the focus of concern in Malta, rather than undeclared work per se).
Sweden The prevalence has increased in the past decade. A study in 2006 showed it to be 5% of GDP, up from about 3% in 1997. Also, 
11% of workers undertook some form of undeclared work in 1997; in 2006, the ﬁ  gure was 13%.
No evidence of change in the prevalence of undeclared work
Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, UK.
• No new speciﬁ  c data, and no indications (e.g. from indirect evidence) of any changes in prevalence.
Belgium Same range of ﬁ  gures as in 2004. A study since 2004 (for the construction sector) has identiﬁ  ed regional differences, with 
higher prevalence in regions of persistently high unemployment.
Greece No new data, but it is understood that the prevalence continues at the same, high level. Bringing the shadow economy into 
GDP ﬁ  gures has led to Greece’s GDP for 2001-06 being revised upwards by over 25% (the revised GDP data are currently 
being validated by Eurostat).
France No overall change. However, there appears to have been an increase in the construction, hotels and catering and commerce 
sectors, with a decrease in ‘other’ service sectors – as measured by breaches of the law.
Luxembourg There are no data on undeclared work (as in 2004). However, there has been an increase in the use of undeclared temporary 
workers (attributed to the strictness of rules regarding use of temporary contracts).
Romania Current estimates of undeclared work put it at 16-21% of GDP with no apparent change in the prevalence of undeclared 
work.
TABLE 1   CHANGES IN THE PREVALENCE OF UNDECLARED WORK, SINCE 20048
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￿
There are no data to suggest that the distribution of un-
declared work across sectors has changed in any Member 
States. The sectors most affected are still construction, 
hotels and catering, agriculture and personal and domestic 
services. Similarly, the groups most likely to be involved in 
undeclared work are also unchanged; immigrants (illegal 
and legal); workers with second, undeclared jobs, students 
and women providing personal and domestic services.
There have been no signiﬁ  cant changes in the measure-
ment of the prevalence of undeclared work since the 
2004 report (see annex 1). There continue to be difﬁ  cul-
ties in adequately measuring undeclared work; the only 
‘advances’ in the ﬁ  eld appear to be a handful of speciﬁ  c 
studies which have added to understanding in some coun-
tries. The Swedish Tax Agency undertook a comprehensive 
study in 2006, and a study on undeclared work in the con-
struction sector was undertaken in Belgium.
In Italy, the Budget Law 2007 introduced the ‘congruity 
indices’ (indici di congruità) which are to specify the num-
ber of labour hours required to produce a good or service, 
broken down by sectors, category of ﬁ  rm and geographi-
cal areas. Firms which do not fall into line with the appro-
priate index will then be subject to inspection. However, 
negotiations about the indices (their quantiﬁ  cation) are 
ongoing between the government and social partners, 
and employers’ organisations remain strongly opposed to 
their introduction. There is interest in this development 
amongst experts in other Member States, but no ofﬁ  cial 
discussions as yet about the possible use of such indices 
in other countries. 
3. THE IMPACT OF 
MINIMUM WAGES
A statutory minimum wage operates in 21 of the 27 coun-
tries.2 In the six countries – Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden – which do not have a statutory 
minimum wage, there is no evidence that wage levels alone 
act as incentives for undeclared work. Clearly, any effect of 
wage levels needs to be considered alongside the impact of 
taxation and social security costs (see Section 4).
There are seven countries for which there is some sugges-
tion that the minimum wage is contributing to the preva-
lence of undeclared work (see Table 2). However, it must 
be noted that the evidence is not clear-cut and there 
are no speciﬁ   c studies of the impact of the minimum 
wage, in any of the countries. As would be expected, it is 
the relatively high level at which the minimum wage is 
set that is likely to be acting as an incentive for 
undeclared work from the point of view of employers.
On the other hand, for the employee, the prospect of 
having access to a potentially higher wage and social 
security protection could encourage them to leave the in-
formal economy.  
TABLE 2   COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE MINIMUM WAGE HAS AN IMPACT ON THE PREVALENCE OF UNDECLARED WORK 
Country Comments
Greece There are no speciﬁ  c data on the impact of the minimum wage, but (especially given that it is set close to average blue-collar 
earnings) it is likely to be providing an incentive for undeclared work.
France The minimum wage is regarded as having an impact on undeclared work, although there is no speciﬁ  c evidence. The costs of 
employers’ social contributions linked to the minimum wage are small, but they are increased by contributions to pension 
funds and unemployment insurance.
Cyprus The minimum wage, which applies only to the non-unionised sector, has been increasing in recent years. There are no data or 
studies, but, if anything, these increases would encourage undeclared work.
Latvia The minimum wage has been increased in recent years, aimed at reducing undeclared work. However, there is such a small 
gap between the minimum wage and the minimum level of subsistence, that the effectiveness of this measure is minimal and 
therefore the minimum wage may still be an incentive for undeclared work.
Hungary It is likely that the minimum wage contributes to the prevalence of undeclared work. There is evidence that recent increases in 
the minimum wage have discouraged employment in small ﬁ  rms, and the employment of low-wage and low-skilled workers; 
these factors may, in turn, have encouraged undeclared work.
Malta Employers express concern about the annual increase of the minimum wage and it may therefore act as an incentive for unde-
clared work. However, there is no speciﬁ  c evidence of the minimum wage having an impact on levels of undeclared work.
Poland There is understood to be some impact of the minimum wage but it is very limited, especially given the small numbers on 
the minimum wage.
(2)  European Industrial Relations Observatory9
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For the other 14 countries which have a statutory 
minimum wage, there is no argument to suggest that 
it is having an impact on the prevalence of undeclared 
work (see Table 3). The reasons for the absence of any im-
pact are various, but in many cases it seems to be because 
of the low level of the minimum wage. 
TABLE 3   COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGE HAS NO IMPACT, OR FOR WHICH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
Country Comments
Belgium No speciﬁ  c evidence of any impact.
Bulgaria There does not appear to be an impact, primarily because those on the minimum wage are exempt from social security con-
tributions, thereby removing an incentive to undertake undeclared work.
Czech Republic The government has been increasing the minimum wage on the basis that this would remove incentives for undeclared work. 
However, there is no evidence of such an impact, and the new government does not appear to be continuing with this policy.
Estonia The impact is negligible, especially given that only around 5% of employees are on the minimum wage.
Ireland There is no evidence of an impact. Breaches of the minimum wage have not been linked to undeclared work.
Spain The minimum wage does not appear to be having an impact, especially because it is relatively low.
Lithuania The minimum wage is very low and is therefore unlikely to be having an impact on the prevalence of undeclared work.  
Luxembourg There is no evidence of any impact.
The Netherlands The minimum wage is well below the lowest wage levels and is therefore unlikely to be having an impact.
Portugal The limited coverage of the minimum wage means that it probably has little impact. If the increases in its value are monitored 
and enforced as planned, it is likely that it will continue to have little impact.
Romania The minimum wage is regarded as helpful in reducing undeclared work.
Slovenia No evidence of any impact.
Slovakia There is no speciﬁ  c evidence of an impact. However, the minimum wage has been increased above labour productivity growth 
and this may have acted as an incentive for undeclared work, particularly in small ﬁ  rms and low-paid sectors.
 United Kingdom There is no evidence of any impact. If the minimum wage level begins to have a detrimental effect on the availability of jobs 
in low paid sectors and occupations, it is more likely that individuals will turn to paid informal work, rather than to undeclared 
work.10
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TABLE 4   SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TAXATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY REGIMES IN EACH COUNTRY3
(3) No information is available for Luxembourg
Country The impact of the taxation and social security regimes
Belgium High taxation and social security contribution levels are regarded as contributing to the prevalence of undeclared work. 
Bulgaria Taxation levels and social security contributions (for employers and employees) are relatively high and there are also perceived 
inequities in the tax regime. Together, these factors mean that the tax regime is an incentive for undeclared work. 
According to the employers’ organisations, medium and large ﬁ  rms are (with minor exceptions) not involved in undeclared 
work. Traditionally, it has been small and micro-businesses, including the self-employed, that have used undeclared work.
Czech Republic High taxation of labour and high social security contributions are regarded as strong incentives for undeclared work.
Denmark Relatively high income and VAT tax rates may act as incentives for undeclared work. There have, however, been reductions 
in income tax rates since 2004, although these are minimal and there is no evidence of any impact on levels of undeclared 
work.
Germany It is considered that the tax and social security contributions are incentives for undeclared work and that contribution levels 
need to be reduced, if undeclared work is to be controlled.
Estonia High labour taxes are regarded as the main reason for undeclared work. Personal income tax rates are being decreased to en-
courage regular employment and the minimum tax rate for social tax has been increased to encourage self-employed people 
to declare larger proportions of their incomes. Personal contributions have a major role in determining the size of beneﬁ  ts. 
However, the beneﬁ  t system includes few incentives for low-wage earners to undertake regular, declared work.  
Ireland The limited information available indicates that there are only tentative links between the size of the shadow economy and 
changes in taxation levels. However, it appears that increased rigour in the application of the tax regime is more likely to im-
pact on undeclared work than are taxation levels themselves. Also, in speciﬁ  c industries – construction and meat processing 
– there is evidence of employers classifying workers as self-employed, thus increasing the likelihood of undeclared work.
Greece The Greek tax regime is regarded as complicated, inequitable and unfair. Tax avoidance and tax evasion are regarded as being 
widespread; tax revenues and the tax base (as well as tax rates) have been declining. The tax burden for middle-income earners 
is being decreased and it is anticipated that this will increase incentives for regular, declared work. 
Social security contributions are high and it is likely that they act as an incentive for undeclared work.
Spain Given the relatively low level of taxation, it is not likely that tax itself encourages workers to undertake undeclared work. 
There is an incentive for small businesses to use undeclared work, since they are taxed in relation to number of employees. 
Also, employers can save considerable social security costs (24% to 28% of paid wages) by not declaring work.
France The tax and social security regimes continue to create disincentives to work, especially for the low paid. This is despite efforts 
to tackle the problem through a system of in-work beneﬁ  ts. In the early 1990s, France had the highest level of social insurance 
funded from social charges on employers. Since then, signiﬁ  cant changes have been made to ‘mutualise’ the cost. However, 
it is argued by some that this has created further incentives for undeclared work, since the link between employment and 
entitlement to social beneﬁ  ts is weaker.
Italy The main reasons for undeclared work appear to be based on employers’ willingness to reduce labour costs by evading tax and 
social security contributions. Some employers employ workers as project contractors (parasubordinati) who then pay 23% 
(instead of 33%) for pension contributions.
4. THE IMPACT OF 
THE TAXATION AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY REGIMES
For the majority of countries, there are arguments that 
the taxation and social security regimes are having a 
strong impact on the prevalence of undeclared work. The 
exceptions are Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. 
In Spain and the UK, the relatively low taxation levels are 
unlikely, on their own, to act as incentives for undeclared 
work. In Ireland and the Netherlands it is not the levels of 
taxation that are impacting on undeclared work, but the 
rigour with which the taxation regimes are being imple-
mented. 
In all other countries, there are clear reasons for the links 
between tax and social security costs and u declared work 
– and such links apply for both employers and employees. 
In most of these countries, it is the smaller employers who 
are most likely to use undeclared work to avoid tax and 
social security payments.These employers are also more 
likely to be able to avoid scrutiny. Amongst employees, 
it is the lower paid and lower skilled who are motivated 
to undertake undeclared work and avoid tax and social 
security payments. 11
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The Netherlands Due to strict controls it has become harder to hire workers without paying tax and social security contributions (especially the 
case in sectors where there are large numbers of temporary, seasonal workers). 
Cash-in-hand workers are not likely to pay tax, but less than 5% of the working population are involved in cash-in-hand 
work.  
Austria The relatively high VAT and income tax rates and high non-wage labour costs are the main reasons for undeclared work. Esti-
mates show that about half of the increase in the black economy is due to increased tax and social security contributions.
Poland The tax regime is regarded as a strong incentive for undeclared work, especially for low wage earners. High taxation levels 
are accompanied by many alternative sources of income from public resources (retirement pension, disability pension, 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts, social assistance beneﬁ  ts), as well as undeclared work; this is not conducive to undertaking declared 
work.
Portugal The corporate income tax rate was reduced in 2005 (from 30% to 25%) and control measures were strengthened. It is not 
possible however to identify if the reduction in the rate led to any reduction in undeclared work. The tax regime for self-
employed people is likely to provide an incentive for undeclared work. 
Firms with low turnover beneﬁ  t from a simpliﬁ  ed tax system and a low rate of 20%; it is concluded that this has decreased 
undeclared work. There are stricter controls on larger ﬁ  rms; this suggests that undeclared work is not used by them. It is not 
possible to identify if the social security regime impacts on undeclared work. Employers regard their social security contributions 
as high, suggesting that they act as an incentive for undeclared work. However, employers are aware that inspection and 
control measures have been increasing in recent years.  
Romania The government introduced a ﬂ  at rate (of 16%) income tax regime in 2005. This has been one factor (among many) likely to 
have contributed to the growth of the economy. However, there are no proper evaluations or assessment of its impact on the 
prevalence of undeclared work. Arguably, the ﬂ  at-rate tax regime could help in reducing the prevalence of undeclared work, 
if maintained long enough. An assessment of all the relevant factors would however need to be undertaken. Overall however, 
given the complexities of factors that lead to undeclared work, such a measure does not constitute a panacea in combating 
undeclared work.
The social security regime is similar to the taxation regime in that steady reductions in the contribution rates for various 
mandatory social security schemes signal the importance attached by national government to the problems created by 
undeclared work. Arguably, optimal thresholds have now been reached and further reductions in contribution rates may 
backﬁ  re. Again no proper evaluations or assessments have been carried out on the impact of the social security regime on the 
prevalence of undeclared work. 
Slovenia The gradual abolition of the payroll tax is underway to increase the attractiveness of work. Personal income tax rates have 
been reduced across the board.
Slovakia Since 2004, all corporate and individual income is taxed at a ﬂ  at rate of 19%. Most of the tax exceptions have been abolished, 
and income taxation has decreased for almost all taxpayers. This had a positive effect on declaring work since there are fewer 
incentives to move income to a lower tax base. 
However, high social security costs continue to provide motivation to employ on low/minimum wages. The system is 
complicated; social contributions are levied on the income from employment, whereas taxes are levied on all types of income. 
This offers a means of minimising or avoiding social security payments.  
Country The impact of the taxation and social security regimes
Cyprus The burden of direct taxation has been reduced since 2004, but income tax and social security contributions are likely to con-
tinue to have an impact on the prevalence of undeclared work. Indirect taxation has increased and this is providing an incentive 
for undeclared work in the service sector. 
There are discussions about increasing social security contributions, with concerns about the impact on undeclared work.
Latvia The major motive for undeclared work is likely to be tax evasion. There is an ongoing debate about the need to simplify the tax 
regime for SMEs and thereby remove incentives for undeclared work. 
The pension system has been revised, linking taxpayers’ contributions to beneﬁ  ts, aiming to encourage payment and remove 
incentives to undeclared work. However, many argue that this is insufﬁ  cient motivation to make tax and social security con-
tributions rather than evade payments. 
Lithuania The taxation and social security regimes are the main drivers of undeclared work. Wages and salaries are relatively low, whereas 
tax and social security contributions are relatively high; these factors combine to act as a strong incentive for undeclared 
work.
Hungary Income tax is high and this is regarded as having an impact on the prevalence of undeclared work. Likewise, social security 
contributions are seen as being strong incentives for undeclared work.
Malta In recent years, income tax levels have been decreased and tax bands revised, thereby reducing an incentive for middle in-
come earners to undertake undeclared work. Corporation tax is charged at a relatively high rate (35%), although it is not clear  
whether this has any impact on levels of undeclared work used by employers. It is regarded that there is widespread abuse of 
the VAT system, especially by self-employed people. 
The difference between the minimum wage and unemployment beneﬁ  t is small and may provide an incentive for unemployed 
people to remain on beneﬁ  t, and supplement their income with undeclared work. 
TABLE 4 (CONT.)   SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TAXATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY REGIMES IN EACH COUNTRY12
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Finland Incentives to work are not strong since taxation is high, social security is generous and public services are free. These factors 
appear to act as a disincentive to work, and an incentive for undeclared work.
Sweden Tax avoidance (coupled with high taxation levels) appears to be the most cited reason for undertaking undeclared work (as 
reported in the 2006 Tax Agency study). This is the motive cited mostly by men, the self-employed and the well educated. 
Doing so is generally regarded as a ‘minor offence’, with a perception that there is little chance of being caught. 
It is generally accepted that relatively high social security contributions have been acting as an incentive for undeclared work. 
A Tax Agency report in 2007 recommends a lower rate of social security contributions (20%, rather than 32%) for employers 
who are private individuals. 
United Kingdom The relatively low income tax levels are considered to reduce incentives for undeclared work. However, the increase in the 
overall tax burden over the past decade is problematic for both businesses and individuals. There are two important issues for 
businesses – the complexity of the tax regime and the large scale of indirect taxes. The fact that formal employment, especially 
for those on a low income, is becoming increasingly temporary and unreliable is not always an incentive to leave beneﬁ  t. Tax 
credits provide support for those on low incomes but create a disincentive for a second earner in a family to work formally.
TABLE 4 (CONT.)   SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TAXATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY REGIMES IN EACH COUNTRY13
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5. MEASURES AIMED AT 
TACKLING UNDECLARED WORK
There continues to be an extensive range of measures being 
implemented in Member States to tackle undeclared work. 
Many of these measures are not aimed solely at reducing 
undeclared work, but are seeking to achieve other goals, 
such as increased employment and stimulation of enter-
prise which have an indirect effect on undeclared work.
Whilst all Member States clearly have an interest in un-
declared work, there are several in which political interest 
is especially high. 
  In Cyprus, undeclared work was not until recently con-
sidered a high priority and, for example, it was almost 
taken for granted that self-employed people would 
pay little, or no, income tax. The government has now 
acknowledged that there are relatively large sources of 
‘additional’ tax revenue hidden in undeclared work.
  France has shown an interest in the issue over a lon-
ger period, since 2000, and has demonstrated this in 
the 2004-05 and 2006-05 National Action Plans for 
the Fight Against Undeclared Work. 
  In Italy there has been a lot of political interest in 
undeclared work in the past three years, prompted 
by several fatal accidents amongst undeclared work-
ers in the construction industry. Tackling undeclared 
work is linked with discussions about the reform 
of the unemployment beneﬁ  t system and possible 
moves toward ﬂ  exicurity principles. However, given 
the size of the informal economy in Italy, any such 
changes may provide further unintended incentives 
for undeclared work.
  In the Netherlands, the government has had a pro-
gramme (Handhavingsprogramma, 2003-06) to tack-
le undeclared work for some time. However, there 
have been concerns about the low rates of detection 
of undeclared work as ‘fraud’; as a result, a new pro-
gramme focused on stronger enforcement has been 
implemented.
  In Portugal, the political interest in undeclared work
has declined as other concerns have come to the fore 
(e.g. recession, unemployment and immigration). 
However, the link between immigration and unde-
clared work has been acknowledged and incentives 
have been introduced to encourage immigrants to 
participate in declared work. The government pub-
lished proposals in 2006 to introduce elements of 
ﬂ  exicurity to the labour market, although these do 
not address undeclared work speciﬁ  cally.
  In Romania undeclared work has always been high on 
the political agenda. Economic growth in recent years 
has highlighted further the dangers of undeclared 
work and this has prompted the introduction of mea-
sures to tackle it. Romania’s ﬁ  rst National Reform 
Programme contains strong awareness of undeclared 
work as an issue and signals measures capable of 
tackling undeclared work. Assessments of the impact 
of these measures on undeclared work are however 
regrettably absent. 
Table 5 summarises the measures which have been in-
troduced by Member States in recent years and thereby 
provides an update to the measures listed in the 2004 
Review. 
It can be seen that there are many examples of measures 
designed to bring about stronger enforcement of actions 
against undeclared work; 21 countries have recently in-
troduced new enforcement measures (and eight of these 
are new Member States). The other most prominent cat-
egory of measure concerns subsidies and tax reductions, 
aimed in general at providing incentives for declared 
work; 16 countries have introduced such measures in 
recent years. Social awareness campaigns have been used 
by ten countries and measures to reduce the administra-
tive burden on businesses and individuals by six coun-
tries. 
It is too early to comment on the success of these mea-
sures. Most of them are recent initiatives, although their 
evaluation would be useful in order to identify ‘good prac-
tice’ to recommend to other Member States.14
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Table 5: Measures aimed at tackling undeclared work
Country Speciﬁ  c measure
Reduction of administrative burdens on businesses and private individuals
Estonia Reduction of legislative and administrative burdens with the help of e-services and using IT solutions to provide services to 
businesses.
Greece Measures are being introduced to support entrepreneurship (especially amongst SMEs). 
These measures are likely to remove some of the incentives for undeclared work.
Spain Measures are being introduced to improve the working conditions and beneﬁ  ts for the self-employed. This should remove 
some incentives for undeclared work.
The Netherlands The procedure for issuing employment permits for employees from certain countries has been simpliﬁ  ed in an effort to 
reduce the number of illegal workers. 
Procedures for declaring tax, for individuals, have been simpliﬁ  ed.
Portugal The procedures for setting up new enterprises have been simpliﬁ  ed.
Slovakia The procedures for setting up new enterprises have been simpliﬁ  ed. Services have been provided to support workers in 
transition from undeclared work to regular work.
Subsidies and tax reductions (including incentives to work in the formal economy)
Belgium Reductions in tax and social security contribution levels, to provide incentives for declared work.
Bulgaria Reductions in tax and social security contribution levels are being introduced in 2007, although the scope of excise duty is 
being extended. The net result may have a neutral impact on undeclared work.
Czech Republic A reduction of the tax rates for lower income earners was introduced in 2006, to provide an incentive for declared work.
Denmark The scope of the Home-Service Scheme (introduced in 1994, to pay a subsidy to households buying household services), has 
been tightened over the years   – from an original subsidy of 50% of the costs and to a narrower range of eligible households. 
This has probably resulted in an increase of women in undeclared work; there are now demands to widen the scheme again, 
in order to reduce undeclared work.
Estonia Reduction of taxes and social security reforms.
Spain The status of foreign workers was regularised in 2005. This resulted in 500,000 immigrants becoming legal workers. Mea-
sures were introduced in 2006 aimed at encouraging permanent work, through monetary incentives including reductions in 
social security contributions. 
Measures have recently been introduced to improve working conditions in domestic services. This will improve working 
hours, offer unemployment beneﬁ  ts and increase the costs of ﬁ  ring such workers. 
Tax reforms have been introduced to beneﬁ  t lower earners (a 17% saving for 60% of taxpayers).
France VAT on renovation work in private homes and on personal services was reduced (leading to the creation of around 50,000 
jobs in two years). 
A measure (introduced in 2001) which allows unemployed people to start work without immediate loss of beneﬁ  ts has 
been widened.
The Netherlands Tax credits for everyone in paid employment have been introduced to make paid employment more gainful, especially for 
people at the lower end of the labour market. An attempt has been made to legalise illegal cash-in-hand work, such as 
household services. The number of hours above which social security contributions need to be paid is now fairly high.
Austria A service voucher scheme for household services has been introduced in the care sector. Only workers holding a work permit 
are eligible and take-up has been less than expected.
Poland The social insurance burden for the newly self-employed was reduced in 2005. In the ﬁ  rst 24 months of self-employment, 
the basis of assessment is decreased to 30% of the minimum wage.
Portugal Incentives have been introduced for unemployed people to participate in regular work rather than undeclared work.
Romania A ﬂ  at rate income tax was introduced in 2005. This, and steady reductions in social security contribution levels, are pre-
sented in the National Reform Programme as key measures to tackle undeclared work.
A recent measure by the social partners introduces a higher minimum wage for workers with high educational attainment. 
This is expected to tackle under-declaration of incomes amongst better educated employees, especially prevalent amongst 
SMEs.
Slovakia A ﬂ  at rate of income tax has been introduced to increase incentives to declare activity.
Finland A temporary low-wage support measure was introduced in 2006 to stimulate employment of older, low-income workers. 
The tax allowances for household services has been increased and also expanded to cover care services and renovation 
work.
TABLE 5   MEASURES AIMED AT TACKLING UNDECLARED WORK
Sweden A tax deduction for household services is being introduced from 1 July 2007. The Government has recently stated that it will 
decrease social security contributions in some service sectors (those in which undeclared work is most prevalent).
United Kingdom There are some pilot projects aiming to help people to legitimise their work activity. An in-work beneﬁ  t (Working Tax Credit) 
is used to encourage people to take up formal employment. 15
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Increased regulation of the labour market
Czech Republic Introduction (from 2004) of stricter conditions on the type of jobs which can be performed by self-employed people 
(instead of regular employment contracts). 
Cyprus A law has been implemented (January 2006) that requires compulsory tax returns for those earning above CYP10,000, 
self-assessment by the self-employed, penalties for the late submission of tax returns, and submission of audited accounts 
by the self-employed earning above CYP40,000. 
Malta There are active labour market policies designed to bring about a shift from undeclared work to regular work. These include 
measures targeted at female workers (since females are regarded as making up a large part of the underground economy).
Romania The statutory minimum wage in Romania has been regarded as an important tool to tackle undeclared work. It is not argued 
that the minimum wage increases the incentives for undeclared work.
Addressing labour market rigidities
Bulgaria There are programmes for those disadvantaged in relation to the labour market (e.g. the ‘From Social Assistance to Employ-
ment’ programme will, in 2007, guarantee employment to 27% of the unemployed – it will use 72% of the budget for active 
labour market policies).
Czech Republic Part-time occasional work arrangements for registered unemployed are allowed (from 2004). This has created opportunities 
for unemployed people to work while receiving unemployment beneﬁ  t (up to a level of 50% of regular working hours, or 
half the minimum wage).
Ireland There are several measures that, while not primarily designed to discourage undeclared work, have that effect: Back to Work, 
Back to Education, and Family Income Supplement, as well as disregards and tapers in the taxation regime. The impact of 
these measures has been strengthened, since their value to individuals has been increased. Also, the Activation Measures are 
an important means of discouraging undeclared work; they provide ‘progression paths’ for long-term unemployed people 
into work or training.  
Greece A new law is being drafted which will include a fund to provide indeﬁ  nite employment beneﬁ  ts to older workers in high 
unemployment areas.  
United Kingdom Various initiatives, for example ‘New Deal’, provide substantial support for the unemployed to enter formal work and have 
recently attempted to disrupt informal work by conducting work force interviews at unpredictable times and at short notice.
Stronger enforcement
Belgium Electronic registration of migrant workers’ movements in and out of the country, and of any foreign business activity. 
Improved mechanisms for exchange of information between agencies.
Czech Republic Introduction of more stringent conditions for registration and extension of the powers of the  inspection authority (from 
October 2004). Further restrictive measures (e.g. inspections in the workplace by employment ofﬁ  ces and labour inspec-
torates, ﬁ  nancial penalties for undeclared work) introduced in 2007.
Denmark Stronger controls and enforcement have been introduced since 2004 in speciﬁ  c sectors (e.g. construction and hospitality). 
There has also been new legislation to give the tax authorities greater access to construction sites in order to monitor 
employers’ records.
Germany In 2004, a new law redeﬁ  ned undeclared work to exclude non proﬁ  t-oriented activities, and the competences of customs 
authorities were extended, penalties increased, and the non-payment of social contribution rates was made illegal. Tax fraud 
by private households in relation to ‘mini jobs’ became an administrative offence.
Estonia Recently introduced control activities include additional company inspections, analysis of samples of companies and follow 
up of irregularities. As a result of these measures, the proportion of legally paid wages has increased.
Greece A measure has been introduced to regularise undocumented migrant workers (through three ‘regularisation’ exercises). 
There is also a new law intended to simplify and rationalise resident and work permit rights for migrant workers. 
A further new law is being drafted which will reduce employers’ social security contributions for employees under local col-
lective agreements. It will also modernise the Labour Inspectorate.
France Sanctions have recently been strengthened (e.g. in certain sectors the level of inspections has increased by 14% since 2005 
and the number of inspections of individual workers suspected of undertaking undeclared work has increased). A new sanc-
tion involves the right to remove public assistance and tax credits/subsidies for SMEs using undeclared work.
Italy There were several measures in place before 2004; action has been taken to enforce them more strongly. The Biagi Law 
(2003) outlaws unjustiﬁ  ed parasubordinati contracts (project workers); from 2006, it has been more strongly enforced. 
Newer measures include the so-called Decreto Bersani. This allows for construction sites to be shut down if more than 20% 
of the total workforce are involved in undeclared work, and for a range of other control measures and penalties. 
The Budget Law for 2007 also introduced some important measures, including stronger inspection activities and ﬁ  scal in-
centives for hiring workers on open-ended contracts.
Cyprus Enforcement is being stepped up, to prevent the employment of illegal workers.
Lithuania Stricter control procedures and additional sanctions have been introduced since 2004.
Luxembourg A 2006 law proposes to improve the efﬁ  ciency and operation of the Inspectorate of Labour and Mines.16
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Hungary Stricter controls of workplaces, especially in construction and agriculture, have been introduced. 
In 2008, there will be stricter control over the granting of disability certiﬁ  cates (it appears that many workers with cer-
tiﬁ  cates undertake undeclared work).  
Malta A new law (2005) is aimed at regulating foreign workers and controlling illegal employment. 
There are several measures aimed at detecting social security beneﬁ  t abuse.   
The Netherlands Controls against employers who pay less than the minimum wage per hour will be tightened up.
Stronger enforcement
Austria Recent measures have concentrated on stricter enforcement, including additional staff in the inspection organisations. 
In 2006, ﬁ  nes for illegal employment of foreign workers were doubled. 
Portugal Measures have been introduced to strengthen the inspection and control of the tax and social security regimes (e.g. in-
cluding steps to combat under-declaration of income).
Slovenia The competences of inspectorates have been enhanced to enable them to issue administrative measures and ﬁ  nes. Joint 
inspections between several agencies are now undertaken.
Slovakia Measures include a massive inspection campaign, stronger surveillance and the enforcement of appropriate sanctions.
Finland Several measures have been introduced including obligatory personal IDs for construction site employees, and closer 
scrutiny of migrant workers in businesses using foreign labour. 
A speciﬁ  c project (VIRKE) has aimed to improve cooperation between the tax authorities, police and customs.
Sweden The Swedish Tax Agency was given additional staff in 2006 and 2007 to introduce increased tax controls and audits. 
In the ‘high risk’ sectors of restaurants and hairdressers, employers have been required to keep staff registers, from January 
2007. Construction sector social partners have agreed to the introduction of this requirement.
United Kingdom The inspection authorities take predominantly punitive measures, through prosecution, to reduce informal work when 
linked to beneﬁ  t fraud and tax evasion.
Tax amnesties
Cyprus A tax amnesty programme was introduced recently.
Awareness raising campaigns
Bulgaria A public debate on the problems of undeclared work was held in 2005 (by the social partners – trade union confedera-
tion). 
A social awareness campaign – ‘In the Light’ – began in May 2007, run by the Bulgarian Industrial Association. 
Denmark Since 2004, there have been campaigns to change attitudes to undeclared work, e.g. Fair Play, an information campaign 
run with the social partners to challenge tax evasion, with a special focus on young people.
Germany Public alliances against undeclared work between the social partners and government were established in construction 
and transport. Speciﬁ  c measures undertaken include public information campaigns.
France A ‘good practice charter’, agreed by sectoral representatives, has been implemented for the construction sector.
Lithuania Since 2004 there have been extensive information campaigns in the media to raise public awareness of the problem of 
undeclared work.
Austria Awareness raising campaigns are being considered as a future option.
Romania The National Tax Collection Ofﬁ  ce runs a campaign to warn against undeclared work. 
The British Embassy ran a campaign to highlight the dangers of illegal migration for work in the UK.
Slovakia A sizeable media campaign has been used to raise awareness.
Sweden Efforts have been made to raise social awareness through joint information campaigns by the tax authorities and the 
Economic Crime Authority. Some campaigns have also been undertaken with the social partners (e.g. in the construction 
sector).
United Kingdom There have been several high-proﬁ  le campaigns aiming to deter fraudulent beneﬁ  t claims.
TABLE 5 (CONT.)   MEASURES AIMED AT TACKLING UNDECLARED WORK17
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This update of the position on undeclared work across 
the European Union, since 2004, demonstrates relatively 
little change in the prevalence and the distribution of 
undeclared work in Member States’ economies. It is 
clear that there continues to be much interest in most 
countries in the impact of the taxation and social secu-
rity regimes; concern about possible impact of the mini-
mum wage is less pronounced. 
A common feature of this update and the 2004 Review 
is the relative lack of speciﬁ  c data, or studies, of unde-
clared work. There are a few exceptions to this, but on 
the whole, the level of attention given to undeclared 
work at a political and policy level is not reﬂ  ected 
in the rigour, or the range, of the research on the issue. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that there are signiﬁ  -
cant difﬁ  culties involved in measuring undeclared work.     
There continues to be a wide range of measures being 
used by Member States to tackle the problem of un-
declared work. Most of the measures in question have 
a wider range of objectives and are not speciﬁ  cally 
designed to address the issue of undeclared work. 
Many concern enforcement and initiatives aimed at 
providing incentives for declared work. Given the im-
pressive range of measures being implemented, it will 
be useful to see the outcome of evaluations of their 
effectiveness.18
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ANNEX: PROBLEMS OF ESTIMATING 
AND MEASURING UNDECLARED WORK
The  EEO Review: Autumn 2004 highlighted the prob-
lems associated with measuring undeclared work. These 
problems still exist.
Indirect measurements include the following:
  Monetary methods, such as the measurement of 
the ratio between cash and demand deposits. These 
methods assume that most transactions in the un-
derground economy are carried out in cash, which 
makes it difﬁ  cult to distinguish between legal and 
illegal activity. OECD experts, in compiling their 
handbook on measuring the non-observed economy 
(OECD (2002) Handbook for measurement of the 
non-observed economy), therefore concluded that 
this kind of method is of limited use.
  Labour accounts method. This involves the compari-
son of labour market data (i.e. gathered through the 
Labour Force Survey) with data on labour market 
participation gathered from other sources (i.e. from 
household surveys).
  Econometric modelling. Such models use certain in-
dicators of an undeclared part of the economy and a 
set of supposed determinants, and gather indications 
of its size through modelling.
  Electricity consumption. These estimations com-
pare the amount of energy required in declared ac-
tivities and compare them with measurements of 
actual consumption. This method assumes that 
most undeclared labour is energy intensive and 
these ﬁ  ndings are generally not perceived to provide 
a very accurate picture of the size of the underground 
economy.
Direct measures are based on survey evidence although 
there are a number of difﬁ  culties with such methods:
  Few such surveys have been carried out and time 
series are generally not available.
 Limited  comparability.
  Veracity of ﬁ  ndings depend on quality of question-
naire and skill of interviewers.
  Potential of under-reporting due to disinclination to 
report underground activity. 19
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ARTICLES PRODUCED BY SYSDEM
EXPERTS SPRING 2007
Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and 
measures 
towards combating 
undeclared work
Belgium The preferred deﬁ  nition 
of UDW in Belgium is 
a broad one, including 
undeclared income and 
fraud.
Estimates of the 
prevalence of UDW 
vary greatly, from 6% 
to 20% of GDP. The 
lower ﬁ  gures derive 
from measures which 
use national accounts, 
with the higher 
ﬁ  gures coming from 
macroeconomic studies. 
The sectors which have 
the highest levels of 
UDW are construction, 
household services, food 
and drink, hospitality 
and health care, the 
latter being to a lesser 
extent. 
Since 2004, a study 
of the construction 
industry has found 
high levels of UDW, 
through the ‘pyramid of 
subcontracting’ which is 
prominent in the sector. 
Regional differences 
were observed, with 
more UDW in areas 
with persistently high 
unemployment rates. 
There is limited 
evidence on the proﬁ  le 
of the UDW worker, 
and even less recent 
evidence. However, 
it is accepted that 
independent workers 
and ﬁ  rms are those 
groups most inclined 
towards UDW.
No speciﬁ  c reference 
to the impact of the 
minimum wage.
There are traditional 
reasons for high levels 
of UDW in Belgium: 
high taxation levels, 
red tape, high levels of 
independent work, high 
incidence of immigrant 
workers, and a mistrust 
of the state. 
Recent evidence 
suggests that Belgium 
is performing poorly 
in the basic functions 
of administration and 
justice; this may be 
contributing to low 
levels of tax compliance 
(and therefore relatively 
high UDW, amongst 
other effects).
The impact of the 
social security regime 
is similar to that of 
the taxation regime, in 
particular the high social 
security contribution 
levels are likely to be an 
inducement to UDW.
Interest in Belgium 
in tackling UDW is 
high.  Measures were 
introduced several 
years ago. They 
included: reduction
of taxation, 
administrative 
simpliﬁ  cation, 
increased controls 
and increased penalties. 
The newest initiatives 
include electronic 
registration of migrant 
workers’ movements in 
and out of the country, 
electronic registration 
of any foreign 
business activity, and 
improved mechanisms 
for exchange of 
information between 
agencies.
Despite an extensive 
range of control 
measures, there 
remain weaknesses 
in enforcement and 
punishment.
Although the interest 
and awareness of UDW 
over the years has 
been high, the current 
political will to increase 
control measures 
is not apparent.
However, there is 
agreement between 
government and social 
partners about the 
need to tackle UDW. 
There are speciﬁ  c 
agreements (2005), 
for example, covering 
the construction, 
cleaning, transport and 
surveillance sectors. 
There are also some 
positive measures 
in place to provide 
incentives to declare 
work. These primarily 
concern reductions in 
tax and social security 
contribution levels. 31
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Czech 
Republic
The incentives to par-
ticipate in UDW remain 
high. Although the 
estimates of the scope 
of this phenomenon 
differ, they all agree on 
its signiﬁ  cance in the 
economy (especially in 
construction, agricul-
ture, catering, trade and 
textiles). 
UDW is dominated by 
low skilled male workers 
(sometimes even (...)
For several years the 
government has been 
increasing the statutory 
minimum wage at rates 
surpassing the growth of 
nominal wages. In 2006 
it reached 40% of aver-
age wages in the whole 
economy. 
These increases were 
guided by the opinion 
that a high statutory 
minimum wage is en-
hancing declared (...)
One of the two main 
incentives supporting 
the existence of UDW 
is the high taxation of 
labour, including social 
security contributions 
and personal income 
tax. (The other being the 
dysfunctional system of 
work permits for foreign 
workers.) Given that 
undeclared (untaxed) 
revenues constitute the 
primary motivation (...)
The Czech Republic 
provides guaranteed 
welfare income for 
families, which is close 
to the average wage 
level, which lowers the 
poverty rates, but can 
also be demotivating 
in the search for legal 
employment. The cur-
rent Civic-Democratic 
government is con-
cerned with the extent 
of pro-work (...)
The issue of UDW is not 
a high priority in the new 
government’s reform 
agenda. 
Some steps to improve 
the situation using the 
taxation system have 
been carried out. The 
lowering of the personal 
income tax rates for the 
two bottom income 
brackets took effect in 
2006 and somewhat 
increased the (...)
Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and 
measures towards 
combating 
undeclared work
Bulgaria No data based on the 
national accounts have 
been published since 
2002. Survey data, 
however, show that the 
‘grey economy’ has been 
increasing markedly 
since 2004 and that it 
covers about 35% of the 
economy. 
The sectors which 
account for most 
UDW are agriculture, 
construction, hospital-
ity, motor trade services 
and personal and house-
hold services. 
Immigrant workers, 
students, retired people 
and migrant Bulgar-
ian workers who move 
in and out of the EU 
account for most of the 
UDW. 
The minimum wage 
does not appear to 
have an impact on the 
prevalence of UDW in 
Bulgaria. This is because 
people receiving the 
minimum wage are 
exempt from social 
security contributions, 
thereby removing a 
large incentive for UDW. 
In addition, social part-
ners negotiate minimum 
income levels each year 
for various groups; these 
income levels are also 
exempt from social 
security contributions.
Taxation levels (for 
employers and em-
ployees) are relatively 
high. There are also 
perceived inequities in 
the tax regime. Together, 
these factors mean that 
the tax regime is an 
incentive for UDW (for 
the non-declaration of 
income).
According to the 
employers’ organisa-
tions, medium and large 
ﬁ  rms are (with minor 
exceptions) not involved 
in UDW. Tradition-
ally, it has been small 
and micro-businesses, 
including the self-em-
ployed, that have used 
UDW. Their use of UDW 
seems to be caused by 
the challenging eco-
nomic climate in which 
they operate, and the 
relatively heavy tax and 
social security burden.
Like taxes, social secu-
rity contributions are 
high. The social security 
regime therefore has the 
same incentive for UDW 
as the tax regime.
Interest in UDW has 
been high in Bulgaria 
since 2004. Social part-
ners have been pressing 
the government to take 
further action to tackle 
UDW, and the govern-
ment is concerned 
about the high levels of 
lost revenue as a result 
of UDW. 
There are reductions in 
tax and social security 
levels being introduced 
in 2007 (although these 
are not changing some 
of the perceived unfair-
ness in the regimes). 
However, excise duty 
will be payable on more 
goods. These two chang-
es are likely to result in 
a neutral impact 
on UDW.  
There are also pro-
grammes for those dis-
advantaged in relation 
to the labour market 
(e.g. the ‘From Social 
Assistance to Employ-
ment’ programme will, 
in 2007, guarantee 
employment to 27% of 
the unemployed – it will 
use 72% of the budget 
for active labour market 
policies). 
A social awareness 
campaign – ‘In the Light’ 
– was started in May 
2007 by the Bulgarian 
Industrial Association. 
A public debate on the 
problems of UDW was 
also held in 2005 (by the 
social partners – trade 
union confederation).
The impact of these 
measures has not yet 
been evaluated, but this 
article suggests that 
there are grounds for 
‘negative expectations’. 32
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Czech 
Republic 
(cont.)
(...) highly skilled), not 
only unemployed, but 
also self-employed and 
with regular ofﬁ  cial 
employment contracts. 
The most common prac-
tice of UDW consists 
of tax evasion in small 
companies, undeclared 
earnings from secondary 
jobs, UDW activities of 
registered unemployed 
and high rates of illegal 
employment of foreign 
workers in construction 
and services.
(...) work attractiveness 
among low skilled work-
ers and has minimal 
adverse impact on 
labour demand. There is 
no credible evidence of 
this impact, and the new 
government does not 
seem to be following 
this policy.
(...) for UDW,  there are 
recommendations made 
by academic researchers 
to substantially simplify 
tax legislation and col-
lection and to introduce 
measures to eliminate 
room for disguising 
regular employee-em-
ployer relationships as 
self-employment.
(...) activation incentives 
provided within the 
Czech social support 
system, which are likely 
to lower the ofﬁ  cial-
work disincentives for 
unemployed workers. 
There is strong evidence 
that pretended sickness 
is being widely misused 
due to the relatively 
generous and weakly 
supervised sickness in-
surance scheme. People 
claim sickness beneﬁ  ts 
and perform UDW. 
Czechs have one of the 
highest rates of sickness 
absence in the EU (on 
average, some 7% of the 
workforce is sick at any 
given time). The length 
of sickness is associ-
ated with the regional 
level of wages as well as 
unemployment, which 
may be related to abuse 
of the scheme.
(...) attractiveness of 
declared work, espe-
cially for single workers.
Important measures 
to combat UDW have 
been introduced by 
the new Employment 
Code which came into 
effect in October 2004: 
introduction of more 
stringent conditions 
for registration and 
increased incentives
for employment, 
extension of the 
power of the District 
Labour Ofﬁ  ces as 
an inspection 
authority. 
The code also imposed 
stricter conditions on 
the type of jobs to 
be performed by the 
self-employed 
(who are subject to 
lower implicit taxation 
including social security 
and other contribu-
tions) instead of regular 
employee-employer 
contracts. 
The new Employment 
Code also allowed for 
part-time occasional 
work arrangements 
for registered un-
employed. It cre-
ated opportunities for 
unemployed people to 
work while receiving 
unemployment beneﬁ  t, 
up to a level of 50% of 
regular working hours 
or half the minimum 
wage.
The new Labour Code 
drafted by the MoL 
and the trade unions, 
effective in 2007, also 
introduced further 
restrictive measures (e.g. 
inspections in companies 
and at the workplace 
by employment ofﬁ  ces 
and labour inspectorates, 
ﬁ  nancial penalties for 
UDW). The evaluation 
of measures to combat 
UDW is hard due to the 
insufﬁ  cient policy re-
sponse to UDW and even 
the lack of measures. 
The lack of a signiﬁ  cant 
reform of the work-
permit and immigration 
procedures is the most 
harmful missing policy 
related to UDW.
Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and 
measures towards 
combating 
undeclared work33
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Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation 
regime
Role of social 
security regime
Strategies and 
measures towards 
combating undeclared 
work
Denmark There are many studies 
of UDW in Denmark, 
even though the overall 
prevalence is very 
low (similar to other 
Scandinavian countries). 
The main source of 
data on prevalence 
is a regular survey, 
conducted since 1994. 
It shows that UDW has 
been decreasing since 
2001, measured as a 
percentage of GDP. It 
had been increasing in 
the 1990s, but is now 
down from a peak of 
3.8% of GDP in 2001, 
to 3.0% in 2005. The 
main reasons for the 
decline are: a shift 
in undeclared hours 
worked to the regular 
economy (possibly as a 
result of a Government 
information campaign), 
increased control of 
UDW by the authorities, 
and increased 
involvement by the 
trade unions (protection 
against impact of illegal 
immigrant workers). 
There is evidence that 
the decrease in UDW 
masks an increase in 
UDW amongst women. 
A main explanation 
for this is that most 
male UDW is in the 
construction sector and 
that sector has been 
subject to rigorous 
control in recent years 
to minimise UDW.
There is no minimum 
wage in Denmark, 
although the relatively 
high level of wages 
(coupled with high 
taxation levels) may 
act as an incentive for 
UDW.
Relatively high income 
and VAT tax rates may 
act as an incentive for 
UDW. 
The taxation regime has 
been changed since 
2004 – income   tax rates 
have been reduced. 
However, there is 
no evidence of any 
impact on UDW levels; 
the reductions in tax 
rates are minimal (for 
a low-income earner, 
from 45.5% in 1999, to 
42.9% in 2006).
No commentary on 
social security.
The Government has 
used several initiatives 
to limit the scale of 
UDW.
The Home-Service 
Scheme was intro-
duced in 1994, to pay a 
subsidy to households 
which buy household 
services such as cleaning 
and gardening. It was 
intended to reduce the 
amount of UDW in such 
services, by removing 
the incentives for UDW. 
Its scope has been 
tightened over the years 
(from an original subsidy 
of 50% of the costs and 
to a narrower range of 
eligible households). This 
has probably resulted in 
an increase of women 
in UDW; there are now 
demands to widen the 
scheme again, in order 
to reduce UDW. 
Since 2004, other 
measures have been 
introduced to minimise 
UDW: 
stronger control and  • 
enforcement (e.g. in 
speciﬁ  c sectors such 
as construction and 
hospitality); 
campaigns to change  • 
attitudes to UDW, 
e.g. Fair Play, an in-
formation campaign 
run with the social 
partners to challenge 
tax evasion, with spe-
cial focus on young 
people;
tax regime enforce- • 
ment – e.g. new legis-
lation to give the tax 
authorities greater 
access to construc-
tion sites in order to 
monitor employers’ 
records.
Germany  According to 
macroeconomic 
estimates, the hidden 
economy and UDW 
had been in decline in 
Germany until 2006. 
In 2007, the level is 
expected to rise by 
about 1%. This is 
due to the rise in the 
VAT rate, the rise of 
mini-job taxation, the 
abolition of housing 
allowances, the (...)
No minimum wage The tax wedge is seen as 
the main determinant 
of the volume of the 
shadow economy. The 
reduction of hidden 
activities requires the 
reduction of taxes 
and social insurance 
premiums. However, 
UDW also emerges if 
unemployment is high 
and income prospects 
poor. 
The growth of the (...)
A new law was adopted 
in 2004 to combat 
UDW and tax fraud. 
UDW was redeﬁ  ned to 
exclude non proﬁ  t-
oriented activities, 
the competences of 
customs authorities 
were extended, 
penalties raised, and the 
non-payment of social 
contribution rates was 
made an element of 
crime. 34
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Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social 
security regime
Strategies and 
measures towards 
combating undeclared 
work
Germany 
(cont.)
(...) additional tax 
on top incomes 
and the increase of 
contributions to 
pension and health 
insurance. 
UDW is most 
prevalent in the 
construction and 
hotel and catering 
sectors. This is 
conﬁ  rmed by survey-
based estimates.  
UDW appears to be 
more or less accepted 
by the population, 
especially in the 
activities of private 
households. 
(...) shadow economy 
was also attributed to 
the rise and persistence 
of unemployment in 
Germany.
Tax fraud by private 
households in the area 
of mini jobs became 
an administrative 
offence. 
Public alliances 
between the social 
partners and the 
federal and regional 
government against 
UDW were established 
in the sectors of 
construction and 
transport. Speciﬁ  c 
measures undertaken 
include public 
information campaigns 
and improvements in 
the information ﬂ  ows.  
Estonia The share of UDW has 
decreased to about 
7-8% of GDP, which is 
relatively high compared 
with the EU-15, but one 
of the lowest amongst 
the new Member States. 
Envelope wages have 
also been decreasing. 
Tax evasion is the main 
reason behind the UDW 
in Estonia. In public 
opinion, UDW has 
become less acceptable. 
The impact of the 
minimum wage on 
UDW is negligible. The 
share of employees on 
the minimum wage is 
only around 5%. 
High labour taxes are 
the main reason for 
UDW. The implicit 
tax rate on labour is 
around 38%. To reduce 
labour and capital 
costs and encourage 
regular employment, 
the personal income 
tax rates are decreasing. 
Also, the minimum 
tax rate for social tax 
has increased forcing 
self-employed people to 
declare a larger share of 
their activities. 
Social tax contributions 
have been personalised 
since 1999 and many 
beneﬁ  ts are directly 
related to personal 
contributions and hence 
provide incentives for 
formal employment. 
Personal contributions 
have a major role in 
determining the size of 
beneﬁ  ts. However, the 
beneﬁ  t system creates 
a number of situations 
where there are few 
incentives for low-wage 
earners to enter formal 
employment.
One of the most 
successful policies 
has been a reduction 
of legislative and 
administrative burdens 
with the help of 
e-services and using 
IT solutions to provide 
services to businesses. 
Other policies include 
lowering taxes, social 
security reforms where 
personal contributions 
have a major role in 
determining the size 
of the beneﬁ  ts, and 
the control activities 
undertaken by the 
authorities. 
The measures to 
increase controls over 
UDW include different 
cooperation agreements 
between different state 
institutions mainly 
aimed at information 
exchange and raising 
public awareness. 
Control activities 
include company 
inspections, analysis 
of samples of companies 
and following up 
irregularities, as well 
as activities of local 
government. 
As a result of these, 
the proportion of 
legally paid wages has 
increased alongside 
the tax funds. 
Reforming the 
employment law 
remains an important 
challenge. 
The current legislation, 
outdated in many (...)35
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Estonia 
(cont.)
(...) ways, may induce 
UDW and increase the 
use of self-employment 
with lower social 
protection rather
 than regular 
employment. 
Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation 
regime
Role of social 
security regime
Strategies and
measures towards 
combating undeclared 
work
Ireland There is no new 
evidence which 
challenges the 2004 
estimates of prevalence.  
However, there is some 
doubt now about the 
measures mainly used 
(they were based on 
cash holdings). However, 
other estimates 
(e.g. based on GNP 
aggregates) indicated 
similar results.
Note – the paper 
discusses tax evasion 
and the shadow 
economy, as ‘proxies’ for 
UDW.
A minimum wage was 
introduced in 2001 but 
there are no speciﬁ  c 
studies of its impact 
on UDW. It could be 
that employers would 
engage employees 
on an UDW basis in 
order to pay below the 
minimum wage. Large 
inﬂ  ows of migrants 
can be an incentive 
for some employers 
to use UDW to avoid 
the minimum wage. 
While individual such 
cases have emerged, 
there is no evidence of 
this; breaches of the 
minimum wage have 
not been linked with 
UDW.
There are only tentative 
links between the 
size of the shadow 
economy (= UDW) and 
changes in taxation 
levels. However, recent 
evidence suggests that 
increased rigour in the 
application of the tax 
regime is more likely 
to impact on UDW 
than are taxation levels 
(fraud investigations 
have uncovered 
large-scale evasion of 
tax, mainly by well-off 
individuals, who were 
declaring only part of 
their incomes). Greater 
access to bank accounts 
by the Revenue 
authorities has been a 
signiﬁ  cant feature here.
Also, in speciﬁ  c 
industries – 
construction and meat 
processing – there is 
evidence of employers 
classifying workers as 
self-employed, thus 
increasing the likelihood 
of UDW. 
See note on Activation 
under next heading
Ireland has several 
measures which are 
mainly intended
to encourage 
persons to take up 
employment, but also 
discourage UDW: 
Back to Work, Back
to Education, and 
Family Income 
Supplement, as well as 
disregards and tapers in 
the taxation regime. 
It can be argued 
that the impact of 
these measures has 
been strengthened, 
since their value to 
individuals has been 
increased. 
Also, the Activation 
Measures for the 
unemployed 
(jointly operated by 
the Department of 
Social and Family 
Affairs and FAS) 
are an important 
means of discouraging 
UDW; they provide 
‘progression paths’ 
for long-term 
(3 months+) 
unemployed people 
into work or training. 
Many referred for 
interview leave the 
unemployed 
register, suggesting 
that they may have 
been involved in UDW. 
Thus, the Activation 
Measures are regarded 
as generating 
an additional 
deterrent to UDW. 
A Working Group – 
the Hidden Economy 
Working Group – 
is to be re-launched 
(under the 2007 
Ten-Year Framework 
Social Partnership 
Agreement, 
‘Towards 2016’). 
It is an advisory 
group, and will promote 
more effective ways 
of tackling UDW. 36
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Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and 
measures towards 
combating undeclared 
work
Greece Quantitative data on 
the prevalence of UDW 
are not available. It 
is, however, generally 
accepted in Greece that 
the ‘informal sector’ is 
large, 24-30% of GDP. 
It has led to Greece’s 
GDP for 2001-06 being 
revised upwards by 
over 25% (as a result 
of bringing the shadow 
economy into the ﬁ  g-
ures). The revised GDP 
data are currently being 
validated by Eurostat.
The Greek employment 
structure lends itself 
to a high prevalence of 
UDW – a high propor-
tion of self-employed, 
immigrants and family 
workers, especially in 
agriculture.
There are no data on the 
impact of the minimum 
wage, but (especially 
given that it is set close 
to average blue-collar 
earnings) it is likely to 
be providing an incen-
tive for UDW. 
The main employers’ 
association (SEV) has 
argued for the ability 
to recruit young people 
at below the minimum 
wage. Doing this would 
remove some incentive 
to UDW. 
The Greek tax regime 
is regarded as compli-
cated, inequitable and 
unfair. Tax avoidance 
and tax evasion are 
regarded as being 
widespread. 
Tax revenues and the 
tax base (as well as 
tax rates) have been 
declining; the opposite 
of what is happening 
in most EU and OECD 
countries. 
The Government is 
introducing tax reforms 
which will reduce the 
tax burden for middle-
income earners. It is 
anticipated that this will 
make the tax regime 
more employment-
friendly and increase 
incentives for regular, 
declared work.
Social security contribu-
tions are high; they 
account for more than 
34% of gross labour 
costs (the EU average 
is 31%). It is likely that 
this acts as an incentive 
to UDW.
Several measures 
have been introduced 
in recent years to tackle 
UDW. 
A measure which has 
had a real impact on 
levels of UDW is regu-
larising undocumented 
migrants (through 
three ‘regularisation’ 
exercises). There is also 
a new law intended to 
simplify and rationalise 
resident and work 
permit rights for 
migrant workers. 
There are also measures 
being introduced to 
support entrepreneur-
ship (especially amongst 
SMEs). 
These measures are 
likely to remove some 
of the incentives for 
UDW amongst SMEs 
and the self-employed 
(who have contributed 
disproportionately to 
the prevalence of UDW).
A new law is be-
ing drafted which 
will include a fund 
to provide indeﬁ  nite 
employment beneﬁ  ts 
to older workers in 
high unemployment 
areas. It will also reduce 
employers’ social secu-
rity contributions for 
employees under local 
collective agreements 
and will modernise the 
Labour Inspectorate. It 
is anticipated that these 
changes will reduce the 
level of UDW.
Spain Figures show an increase 
from 2003 to 2006 
(measured by number 
of workers undertaking 
UDW, up from 11.6% to 
12.3%). 
Regularisation of 
Immigrants in 2005 
appears to have caused 
a decrease in UDW, 
in construction and 
agriculture.  
The minimum wage 
does not appear to be 
the explanation for 
the increase in UDW, 
especially because it is 
relatively low. Workers 
seem to accept UDW in 
order to receive higher 
earnings, saving both 
tax and social security 
costs.
It is reasonable to 
conclude that the tax 
regime does not itself 
provide strong incen-
tives for UDW, except 
for those small busi-
nesses which are taxed 
in relation to number of 
employees. 
Given the relatively low 
level of taxation, it is 
not likely that tax itself 
encourages workers to 
undertake UDW.
Employers can save con-
siderable social security 
costs by not declaring 
work   – between 24% 
and 28% of paid wages.
Immigration and 
UDW are linked. 
Therefore the 
government regularised 
the status of foreign 
workers in 2005. This 
resulted in 500,000 
immigrants becoming 
legal workers. 
UDW is also linked to 
the temporary nature 
of much employment. 
The government tackled 
this in 2006 with 
measures aimed at 
encouraging permanent 
work, through monetary 
incentives including 
beneﬁ  ts in social 
security contributions. 
Measures have (...)37
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Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and mea-
sures towards combat-
ing undeclared work
Spain 
(cont.)
(...) recently been 
introduced to improve 
working conditions in 
domestic services. This 
will improve workers’ 
rights (including 
working hours, right to 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts 
and an increase in ﬁ  ring 
costs). 
Tax reforms have 
been introduced to 
beneﬁ  t lower earners 
(a 17% saving for 60% 
of taxpayers). 
This will help to 
discourage UDW.
The government is 
encouraging self-
employment and is 
introducing measures 
to improve the working 
conditions and beneﬁ  ts 
for the self-employed. 
This should remove 
some incentive for UDW 
amongst the 
self-employed.  
France Estimates of the size 
of UDW in the French 
economy depend on the 
method used for calcu-
lation. The report pub-
lished by the Commis-
sion on undeclared work 
in the EU estimates the 
level of UDW in France 
to be between 4% and 
6.5% of GDP.
The sectors most affect-
ed by the phenomenon 
are construction, hotels 
and catering, other 
services and commerce. 
Statistics measuring 
the level of reported 
breaches of the legisla-
tion in relation to UDW 
in different sectors show 
an increase in such 
offences in all these 
sectors between 2003-
2005 with the exception 
of ‘other services’ which 
have witnessed a signiﬁ  -
cant decline. 
The minimum wage, 
linked to a system of 
social security and 
other contributions 
for employers, can be 
seen to play a role 
in UDW. While the 
level of employer social 
contributions linked to 
the minimum wage is 
rather small, this cost 
is raised by contribu-
tions to pension funds 
and unemployment 
insurance. Another fac-
tor is the low marginal 
productivity of work 
at this pay scale and 
in these sectors which 
have no difﬁ  culties in 
recruiting staff.
Particularly for the 
low paid, the tax and 
social insurance system 
continues to create 
disincentives to work 
(and incentives to 
underreport activity), 
despite efforts to seek 
to address this problem 
through a system of 
in-work beneﬁ  ts.
High social insurance 
costs and other levies 
on enterprises have long 
been blamed for the 
persistence of UDW in 
the French economy. In 
the early 1990s’, France 
had the highest level of 
social insurance funded 
from social charges on 
employers. Since then, 
signiﬁ  cant changes 
have been made to this 
system in an effort to 
‘mutualise’ more of the 
cost of social insurance. 
However, it is argued by 
some that this system 
has created further in-
centives for UDW as the 
link between employ-
ment and entitlement 
to social beneﬁ  ts is 
weaker. New ways of 
funding unemployment 
and social insurance 
beneﬁ  ts are currently 
being studied.
Since 2000, 
there has been a real 
willingness in France 
to give this issue 
higher priority as 
demonstrated by 
the formulation and 
implementation of the 
2004-05 and 2005-06 
National Action Plans 
for the Fight Against 
Undeclared Work, which 
have included incen-
tive and disincentive 
measures.
Among the successful 
measures were 
the reduction of
 VAT on renovation work 
in private homes and 
personal services. 
It was estimated 
that in the ﬁ  rst two 
years of its operation 
in the early 2000s this 
measure created 34,000 
jobs directly and 20,500 
indirectly. 
The experiment has 
been extended through-
out the EU until 2010 
and a further evaluation 
will be carried out 
in France in 2007. 
In 2005 the European 
Council refused to apply 
the same measures to 
the catering industry.  
The new French (...)38
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Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and 
measures towards com-
bating undeclared work
France 
(cont.)
(...) President has 
committed himself to 
re-examining this issue. 
In the personal services 
sector, tax reductions, 
service vouchers and new 
tax credits for individuals 
legally taking on such staff 
should have the effect of 
reducing illegal immigra-
tion and UDW. Similar 
measures have also been 
taken to simplify employ-
ment in the area of live 
performance. Since 2001, 
measures have been put in 
place to allow unemployed 
individuals to start work 
without immediate loss of 
social insurance and other 
beneﬁ  ts. This system has 
been widened to reduce 
disincentives to work.
Prevention measures have 
also included awareness 
raising and other voluntary 
measures, such as the 
‘good practice charter’ 
agreed by sectoral repre-
sentatives in the construc-
tion sector.
The regime of sanctions 
applied has also recently 
been strengthened (e.g. in 
certain sectors the level of 
inspections has increased 
by 14% since 2005). A new 
law on SMEs also high-
lights greater controls and 
sanctions against UDW. 
Strengthened administra-
tive sanctions include the 
right to remove public 
assistance and tax credits/
subsidies for employers 
found guilty. There are 
also increasing numbers of 
inspections and sanctions 
for individuals engaged in 
UDW.
Italy There has been much 
political interest in 
UDW in Italy over 
the past three years, 
prompted in particular 
by some fatal accidents 
amongst undeclared 
workers in the 
construction industry.
The National Institute 
of Statistics and the 
Industrial Develop-
ment Association in the 
south produce (similar) 
estimates of the 
prevalence of UDW, 
based on national 
accounts. Estimates 
show a reduction in (...)
No minimum wage in 
Italy.
The main reasons for 
UDW appear to be 
based on employers’ 
willingness to reduce 
labour costs by evading 
tax and social security 
contributions.
As noted, evasion 
of social security 
contributions and tax 
appears to account for 
UDW. Some employ-
ers employ workers 
as project contractors 
(parasubordinati) who 
then pay 23% (instead 
of 33%) for pension 
contributions. But 
in the new notional 
deﬁ  ned contribu-
tion pension system 
beneﬁ  ts depend on 
contributions paid, 
and this will further 
decrease pension 
replacement rates.
Italy has several measures 
aimed at tackling UDW 
which were in place prior 
to 2004. Enforcement has 
not always been rigorous. 
For example, the Biagi 
Law (2003) outlaws 
unjustiﬁ  ed parasubordinati 
contracts, but until 2006 
it was not strongly 
enforced. 
Newer measures include 
the so-called Decreto 
Bersani. This allows for 
construction sites to be 
shut down if UD workers 
are 20% of the total 
workforce and for a range 
of other control (...)39
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Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and measures 
towards combating 
undeclared work
Italy (...) the proportion of 
GDP accounted for by 
UDW; from 7.6% of 
GDP in 2000 to 6.4% 
in 2006. However, this 
reduction depends 
almost entirely on 
the 2002 amnesty for 
illegal migrant workers 
(647,000 of them). 
UDW is highest 
amongst the lower 
productivity sectors 
and geographical areas: 
agriculture, services, 
construction, and in the 
south.
(...) measures and penalties 
for UDW. The Budget Law 
for 2007 also introduced 
some important measures, 
including stronger 
inspection activities and 
ﬁ  scal incentives for hiring 
workers on open-ended 
contracts. It also included 
the ‘congruity indices’ 
(indici di congruità) – these 
may be recommended as 
good practice for other 
Member States. These 
indices are to specify the 
number of labour hours 
required to produce a good 
or service, broken down by 
sectors, category of ﬁ  rm 
and geographical areas.
Their values are to be 
negotiated between the 
government and social 
partners. Firms which 
do not fall into line with 
the appropriate index 
will then be subject to 
inspection. Employers’ 
organisations are strongly 
opposed to the indices and 
negotiations with social 
partners about their value 
are still under way.
Tackling UDW is seen 
as being linked with 
discussions about 
the reform of the 
unemployment beneﬁ  t 
system and possible 
moves toward ﬂ  exicurity 
principles. However, given 
the size of the informal 
economy in Italy, any 
such changes may provide 
further unintended 
incentives for UDW.
Cyprus There are no ofﬁ  cial 
ﬁ  gures on the preva-
lence of UDW in Cyprus. 
However, it seems that 
the main types of type 
of UDW are by: illegal 
immigrants employed 
in legal work such as 
construction; the under-
reporting of income 
by the self-employed; 
paid workers (including 
teachers and doctors) 
holding second, unde-
clared jobs contrary to 
their terms of employ-
ment; work by retired 
people, students and 
those on beneﬁ  ts who 
may not declare jobs 
they hold. Estimates are 
that these workers and 
their UDW (...)
The minimum wage 
which only applies to 
the non-unionised sec-
tor has been increasing 
in recent years. Though 
no data or studies 
conﬁ  rm this, it is likely 
that these increases 
would act to increase 
undeclared work.
There is an incentive for 
individuals to avoid 
income tax through 
UDW. This is the case 
despite the fact that 
the burden of direct 
taxation was reduced in 
2004. However, it must 
be noted that indirect 
taxation has increased, 
providing an incentive 
for the service sector in 
particular to use UDW. 
Social security 
contributions are set 
at 6.3% of insurable 
earnings (payable by 
both employers and 
employees). This is 
likely to be an incen-
tive for UDW. 
There are discussions 
under way to increase 
the contribution 
levels to improve the 
viability of the social 
insurance scheme. 
This is likely to lead to 
a potential increase 
in UDW. From this 
standpoint, it may be 
preferable to improve 
the viability of the 
social security system 
by increasing the 
retirement age. 
Until recently, UDW was 
not considered a high 
priority in Cyprus and it 
was, for example, taken for 
granted that self-employed 
people would pay little, 
or no, income tax. The 
government has started 
to acknowledge that 
there are relatively large 
sources of ‘additional’ tax 
revenue in UDW. Measures 
implemented recently 
include:
a tax amnesty  • 
programme;
a new law (impl- • 
emented in January 
2006) which 
requires compulsory 
tax returns for those 
earning (...)40
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ing undeclared work
Cyprus 
(cont.)
(...) amounts to about 
10% of GDP; illegal 
immigrants and under-
reporting by the self-
employed account for 
the majority of UDW. It 
is not known whether 
small ﬁ  rms are more 
inclined to UDW than 
larger ones.
It is regarded that UDW 
occurs at relatively 
high levels because of 
unskilled labour short-
ages, ﬂ  exibility of hiring 
and ﬁ  ring immigrant 
workers, and the lower 
costs (to employers and 
for employees) of UDW. 
Under-reporting by the 
self-employed avoids 
income tax.
(...) above CYP10,000 
self-assessment 
by the self-employed, 
penalties for 
the late submission 
of tax returns, 
and submission 
of audited accounts 
by the self-employed 
earning above 
CYP40,000. 
The above measures 
are designed to reduce 
tax evasion by the 
self-employed, but it 
is doubtful whether 
they will have an 
impact because their 
enforcement is not 
assured. 
The government is also 
clamping down on the 
employment of illegal 
workers.  
Latvia There is no consensus 
in deﬁ  ning UDW, and 
different deﬁ  nitions, 
indicators and measures 
are used. The estimates 
are various, and range 
from 16-18% by the 
state institutions to 
40% or more by private 
commentators. The 
highest prevalence 
of UDW is thought 
to be in construction 
and wood industries. 
Underreporting of 
income (envelope 
wages) is rather more 
prevalent.
Since 2002 the 
government has 
been increasing the 
minimum wage, hoping 
to reduce incentives 
to pay the minimum 
wage + cash in the 
envelope. However, 
the gap between the 
minimum wage and 
the minimum level of 
subsistence undermines 
the effectiveness of the 
measure.
The major motive 
for underreporting 
of income is likely 
to be tax evasion. 
There is an ongoing 
discussion about the 
need to simplify the tax 
administration for SMEs.
To curb the evasion of 
social tax, the pension 
system has been 
overhauled, linking 
taxpayers’ contributions 
to beneﬁ  ts. Reforms 
of maternity leave 
were undertaken, with 
higher beneﬁ  ts for 
mothers who have 
paid larger social tax 
payments. However, 
commentators argue 
that given the unstable 
social insurance system, 
many citizens are not 
motivated to put future 
gains from making tax 
and social contributions 
before present gains 
from tax evasion.
Surveillance of 
enterprises is undertaken 
to identify workers 
without work contracts, 
resulting in ﬁ  nancial 
penalties for ﬁ  rms. 
Preventive activities, such 
as reminders, explanation 
requests, interviews, 
seminars and public 
information campaigns 
are also undertaken. 
Co-operation activities 
between different 
state bodies involved 
in tackling UDW are 
underway. 
However, 
administrative barriers 
and contradictory 
regulations undermine 
the effectiveness of 
inspections. In addition, 
no personal ﬁ  nes can 
be levied on enterprise 
owners/managers in 
breach of rules (only 
corporate ﬁ  nes are 
allowed). 
The problem of 
enforcement is acute. 
Policy relying on ﬁ  nes 
is unlikely to be very 
effective as enforcement 
of such ﬁ  nes is weak. 
Fiscal decentralisation 
has had the effect of 
curbing tax evasion. 
Local government has 
a stake in improved tax 
collection as it receives 
a large proportion 
of personal income 
tax revenue. 
The government 
claims UDW is (...)41
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regime
Strategies and mea-
sures towards combat-
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Latvia 
(cont.)
 (...) decreasing, and 
points to increasing 
social tax payments. 
However, reasons for 
this are unclear, as the 
result of the baby boom, 
reforms in the pension 
system or maternity 
leave payments could 
be behind such changes. 
Lithuania UDW has started to 
shrink signiﬁ  cantly 
since 2003/2004, as 
economic growth and 
mass emigration led to 
shortages of employees 
in many sectors. An 
improved situation on 
the labour market led to 
increasing employees’ 
demands for better 
renumeration and work 
conditions. UDW has 
shrunk from about 8% 
of the total employed to 
about 6%. 
UDW is more prevalent 
amongst small 
companies and more 
frequent amongst lower 
skilled and lower paid 
individuals. 
The minimum wage 
has been growing 
rapidly, but is still very 
low compared with 
the EU-15. Regarding 
non-contractual em-
ployment in registered 
enterprises, the level 
of the minimum wage 
is too low to encour-
age regularising UDW. 
In cases of envelope 
wages, employers link 
the legally paid part of 
wages to the level of the 
minimum wage.
The tax and social 
security regimes are the 
main drivers of UDW. 
The levels of wages 
and salaries are low, 
whereas the levels of 
tax and social security 
contributions are 
relatively high. Roughly, 
the average tax wedge 
on a salary is about 
50%.
A central co-ordination 
unit exists to analyse 
the origins and 
co-ordinate the control 
and prevention of UDW 
within the State Labour 
Inspectorate. Different 
institutions conduct 
joint inspections 
and share relevant 
information. 
Since 2004, special 
prevention measures 
have been developed 
(extensive information 
campaigns in the 
media, research 
into UDW). Stricter 
control procedures of 
work conditions and 
additional sanctions 
have also been 
introduced. 
Luxem-
bourg
There is no systematic 
data on UDW in Lux-
embourg. In 2006, the 
Inspectorate of Labour 
and Mines carried out 
17 major actions, 4 
speciﬁ  c actions against 
UDW and 217 medium 
size actions leading to 
10 preventive closures 
of construction sites.
There has been a rise 
in the use of unde-
clared temporary 
workers, which has 
been attributed to the 
strictness of the labour 
code regarding the use 
of temporary contracts. 
In addition, increasing 
recourse to competi-
tive tendering has given 
rise to more and more 
employers being unclear 
about who exactly is 
working on their sites.
The lack of data on 
UDW makes it difﬁ  cult 
to assess the impact 
of minimum wages, 
tax and social security 
regimes on this phe-
nomenon.
However, the study 
‘2Plus’ argues that UDW 
is increasingly the result 
of ‘underemployment’ 
in the regular economy, 
which, in order for 
employers to avoid 
paying taxes and social 
security contributions, 
drives workers into hav-
ing to take on second 
undeclared jobs, often 
in the personal services 
sector. The project also 
proposes a system 
for the regularisation 
of ‘occasional’ work, 
which allows employ-
ers to beneﬁ  t from tax 
beneﬁ  ts while enabling 
such employees to be 
covered for the pur-
poses of pension 
and social insurance.
A separate administra-
tive unit for the ﬁ  ght 
against UDW has been 
established.
A law of 2006 is propos-
ing to improve 
the efﬁ  ciency and 
operation of the Inspec-
torate of Labour and 
Mines.42
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Hungary There have not been 
any new comprehensive 
measures issued on the 
prevalence of UDW 
since 2004, but UDW 
is a serious problem for 
the Hungarian economy, 
where the labour activ-
ity rate has been low 
since the beginning of 
the transition. It is prob-
able that a signiﬁ  cant 
number of long-term 
inactive people actually 
work unofﬁ  cially.
These workers can be 
grouped in at least two 
distinct groups: without 
a labour contract and 
not paying any taxes, 
and those ‘forced’ entre-
preneurs (with different 
tax margins and possible 
costs deductions).  
There is some evidence, 
but not a formal study 
on the effect of the 
abrupt increase in the 
minimum wage on the 
prevalence of UDW. The 
existing evidence shows 
the negative impact 
of a large increase of 
the minimum wage on 
employment in small 
ﬁ  rms and the job ﬁ  nding 
probabilities of low-
wage and low-skilled 
workers. The effects 
appear to be stronger 
in depressed regions, 
where the minimum 
wage bites deeper into 
the wage distribution.
High income tax coun-
tries – such as Hungary 
– would be expected 
to have a high rate of 
undeclared work. The 
tax regime has a more 
long-lasting effect on 
the prevalence of UDW, 
than such measures as 
strict control of employ-
ers (which in Hungary 
is also successful to 
some extent). In the 
long term, high taxes 
will affect negatively 
the activity rate in the 
country and increase 
labour costs. 
Those who continue to 
be registered employees, 
but declare lower wages 
simply to avoid taxes, 
have to pay higher taxes 
and contributions, as 
they pay them after 
the new level of the 
minimum wage.  
The government issued 
a new piece of regula-
tion (in September 
2006), which increased 
the payment of social 
security contributions 
for those on the mini-
mum wage, unless they 
declared that they were 
earning the minimum 
wage; in this case, 
however, the individual 
ran the chance of facing 
a tax control. 
As a result, starting in 
2007, 140,000 people 
started to pay social 
security contributions, 
possibly caused by the 
control of the social 
security system.
The increase of the 
social security contribu-
tion from 2% of the 
gross salary to 6% could 
have a negative impact 
on declared employ-
ment. 
Stricter controls of work-
places (especially 
in construction, agricul-
ture and trade, where 
UDW is the most preva-
lent) were introduced, 
followed by ﬁ  nes for 
those engaged in UDW. 
Next year the system 
of granting disability 
pensions is going to be 
changed, introducing 
stricter controls when 
obtaining a disability 
certiﬁ  cate. It is a serious 
problem, as a large part 
of Hungarian inactive 
people receive dis-
ability pensions (there 
are around 500,000 dis-
ability pensioners under 
the retirement age limit, 
which is 7.3% of the 
population aged 15-64). 
Regulation that actu-
ally encourages people 
to work legally is the 
stricter control of health 
insurance payments. 
Starting with next year, 
only those who have 
either paid the 
contribution on a regular 
basis, or where the state 
pays their insurance on 
the basis of their social 
situation, will receive 
free-of-charge health 
assistance. 
Regulation concerning 
the work of pensioners 
also changed. Starting in 
2006, working pension-
ers have to contribute 
8.5% of their pension 
to the state budget. If a 
person retired before the 
retirement age, up to the 
eligibility age he or she 
can only work if his pen-
sion is suspended for the 
period of employment. 
This change may have a 
positive effect on the
state budget, as early 
retirement becomes 
more expensive for 
the individual, but 
it also increases the 
costs of declared work 
for all pensioners, and 
especially for those 
below the retirement 
age. Thus, it is likely that 
some pensioners will 
choose to work without 
a labour contract. 43
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Malta There has not been 
much political interest 
speciﬁ  cally in UDW 
in Malta. Focus has 
been more on the 
‘underground economy’ 
(illegal work and UDW). 
Interest has also focused 
on the abusers of social 
security, on illegal 
immigrants and on 
concerns about female 
employment (the latter 
is linked with the Lisbon 
Strategy).
There are no ofﬁ  cial 
ﬁ  gures on the 
prevalence of UDW. 
Unofﬁ  cial estimates 
of the ‘underground 
economy’ (UDW and 
illegal work) put it 
at 25% of GDP. It is 
regarded as consistently 
increasing over the last 
few years.
UDW appears to occur 
mostly in construction, 
household services and 
hospitality.  
It is difﬁ  cult to ascertain 
if the minimum wage 
is having on impact 
on levels of UDW. 
Employers express 
concern about the 
annual increase of the 
minimum wage and it 
may therefore act as an 
incentive for UDW.
In recent years, in-
come tax levels have 
decreased. In the last 
budget, the government 
revised the tax on bands 
and thereby removed 
an incentive for middle 
income earners to take 
on UDW.
Corporation tax is 
charged at a rela-
tively high rate (35%), 
although it is not clear 
whether this has any 
impact on levels of 
UDW.   
It is regarded that there 
is widespread abuse of 
the VAT system, espe-
cially by self-employed 
people.
The difference between 
the minimum wage and 
unemployment beneﬁ  t 
is small. This does not 
therefore provide an 
incentive to take regular 
work. Instead, it may 
provide an incentive 
for unemployed people 
to remain on beneﬁ  t, 
and supplement their 
income with UDW. 
The social security sys-
tem is currently being 
evaluated to identify if 
it can be improved so 
as to encourage more 
people to fully declare 
work.
The principal 
components of 
ﬂ  exicurity are being 
discussed in Malta; 
discussions take the 
form of exploring 
improvements to 
workforce ﬂ  exibility 
whilst also improving 
the social security 
system. The latter is 
regarded as closely 
linked to UDW (i.e. 
abuse of social security 
beneﬁ  ts is seen as 
linked to undertaking 
UDW).  
The debate about 
immigration focuses 
on the growth in the 
number of illegal 
migrants in Malta, and 
on their involvement 
in UDW. This is seen to 
be distorting the labour 
market, especially in 
construction and in 
hospitality. 
The government has 
several initiatives which 
are directly or indirectly 
tackling UDW.  These 
include a new law 
(from 2005) aimed 
at regulating foreign 
workers and controlling 
illegal employment. 
The Employment and 
Training Corporation 
conducts skills proﬁ  les 
of all unemployed 
people to refer them 
to training and 
employment. 
There are several 
measures aimed 
at detecting social 
security beneﬁ  t abuse. 
A range of measures 
have been introduced 
to improve the taxation 
system. 
There are also active 
labour market policies 
designed to bring about 
a shift from UDW to 
regular work. 
This includes measures 
targeted at female 
workers (since females 
are regarded as making 
up a large part of the 
underground economy). 
The 
Nether-
lands
The level of UDW 
is difﬁ  cult to quantify. 
Existing ﬁ  gures 
only apply to the 
number of investiga-
tions that have (...)
The lowest pay scales 
are well above the mini-
mum wage level so the 
wage level as such may 
be a reason for UDW 
but this is not (...)
Due to strict controls 
it has become harder 
to hire workers in the 
Netherlands without 
paying wage tax. 
Cash-in-hand (...)
Due to strict controls it 
is more difﬁ  cult to hire 
workers without paying 
social security contribu-
tions. This is especially 
the case in sectors (...)
The Dutch Govern-
ment is determined to 
achieve improvements 
in combating UDW 
(Handhavingsprogramma  
2003-06). 44
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The 
Neth-
erlands 
(cont.)
(...) been carried out and 
fraud cases detected. 
Therefore ﬁ  gures are 
not representative 
for the actual level of 
UDW. Sectors known 
for a high level of illegal 
employment include 
construction, hotels and 
restaurants.
(...) an effect of the 
minimum wage level.
(...) workers are not 
likely to pay tax.
Hiring a moonlighter 
may be attractive, as 
they charge a lower 
price and because no 
VAT would be payable. 
Less than 5% of the 
working population 
would be involved in 
cash-in-hand working.
(...) where there are 
large numbers of tem-
porary (seasonal) work-
ers. Frequent controls 
are carried out.
The Court of Audit 
however found that the 
probability of someone 
who commits fraud be-
ing detected is very low 
for all types of fraud. 
The Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment 
published a new pro-
gramme Handhaving-
sprogramma 2007-10 
which aims amongst 
other objectives to in-
tensify the ﬁ  ght against 
illegal employment. 
By liberalising the pro-
cedure for employment 
permits for employees 
from Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania, 
the government aims 
to decrease the number 
of illegal workers. 
At the same time con-
trols against employers 
who pay less than the 
minimum wage per hour 
will be tightened.
Procedures for declaring 
tax have been simpliﬁ  ed 
reducing the chance 
that tax payers will ‘for-
get’ certain sources of 
income. This is done by 
supplying tax forms to 
tax payers with existing 
and known information 
already completed.
Tax credits for everyone 
in paid employment 
help to make paid 
employment more 
gainful, especially for 
people at the lower 
end of the labour 
market.
An attempt has been 
made to legalise illegal 
cash-in-hand work 
like house cleaning. 
The number of hours 
above which you need 
to pay social security 
contributions is now 
fairly high which means 
that this kind of fraud 
has disappeared.  
The labour unions 
play an explicit role in 
ensuring that employers 
do not hire illegal 
workers or pay foreign 
workers less than the 
wages negotiated in 
the collective labour 
contracts, acting as a 
partner of government 
in preventing and 
combating UDW. 45
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Austria UDW is a relevant 
labour market issue, de-
spite a decrease of the 
proportion of the black 
economy in the GDP. 
UDW is frequent in the 
ﬁ  eld of care and nursing 
of elderly people, where 
a signiﬁ  cant number of 
people from the new 
Member States are 
employed. Restriction of 
access of workers from 
the NMS means that 
UDW is the only way 
to ﬁ  nd employment in 
Austria. 
The attitudes of Aus-
trian citizens towards 
UDW are lax. 
The national minimum 
wage does not yet exist. 
Collective bargaining 
takes place at a sectoral 
level. The government 
plans to introduce 
a general monthly 
minimum wage of EUR 
1,000, which is currently 
being negotiated. Its 
effects on UDW are 
debated 
at the moment.
The relatively high VAT and income tax rates and 
high non-wage labour costs are the main drivers 
behind the UDW. Some estimates show that about 
50% of increase in the black economy is due to the 
increase in tax and social security contributions.
The measures concen-
trate on the stricter 
enforcement of the 
existing rules. 
Also, the increase of 
staff in the institution 
responsible for tackling 
UDW and extension 
of its competences are 
expected to lead to a 
stricter enforcement of 
the relevant acts. 
In 2006, the ﬁ  nes for 
illegal employment of 
foreign workers were 
doubled. Also, employers 
were obliged to keep 
up-to-date accounts 
where cash transactions 
were involved. 
Social partners have 
proposed to oblige 
employers to register 
all newly employed 
workers before the 
employee starts work. 
This is currently used 
as a loophole in case of 
inspections. 
To address UDW in 
the care sector, the 
government introduced 
a service voucher for 
household activities. 
Employees remunerated 
by the voucher become 
part of the social insur-
ance system. The take-
up of the voucher has 
been less than expected. 
Only workers holding a 
work permit are eligible. 
Future options to 
combat UDW include 
campaigns to raise 
awareness of UDW 
and the reduction of 
tax rates or non-wage 
labour costs. 
Poland The ‘black economy’ 
share of the GDP total 
in Poland is between 
12% and 15% and is 
decreasing. The scale of 
UDW in 2004 decreased 
in comparison with 
previous years (1995, 
7.6%; 1998, 4.7%; 2004, 
4.2% of persons aged 
15 and above took up 
UDW).
UDW is most often 
undertaken by men 
(63% of the total 
number of undeclared 
employees), inhabitants 
of cities (52%), mostly 
aged 45-59, with 
elementary vocational 
education and lower 
education (69%). 
The inﬂ  uence of 
minimum pay on UDW 
is weakened by the 
possibility of it being 
reduced. From 2003-05 
employers had the 
opportunity to ﬁ  x pay 
lower than the deﬁ  ned 
minimum but not lower 
than 80% of minimum 
pay for the ﬁ  rst year 
worked and 90% in the 
second year of work.
In December 2005 
221,300 persons 
received pay which 
did not exceed the 
minimum wage and 
34,700 persons received 
pay at the permitted 
sub-minimum level.
The high tax wedge has 
a negative inﬂ  uence on 
the employment of the 
least productive persons, 
whose potential wages 
are close to minimum 
pay. The tax wedge is 
higher in Poland than 
the EU average, and the 
difference in 1999-2004 
was clearly increasing.
The tax wedge also 
includes para tax 
burdens of various 
characters. 
For a number of Poles 
avoiding ﬁ  scal burdens 
is not seen as theft 
because they do not see 
the link between their 
actions and the neces-
sity to impose (...)
The existence of the 
high tax wedge is ac-
companied by a number 
of sources of alternative 
income from public 
resources, such as retire-
ment pension, disability 
pension, unemploy-
ment beneﬁ  ts, social 
assistance beneﬁ  ts, and 
from UDW, which is not 
conducive to increasing 
the attractiveness of 
legal work.
High taxation of work 
encourages low wage 
earners in particular 
(i.e. usually low quali-
ﬁ  ed) to escape into 
the ‘black economy’ 
and make use of 
available beneﬁ  ts. 
UDW is perceived 
as a socio-economic 
problem, however 
no clear measures to 
limit it are apparent, 
particularly in relation 
to those aimed at 
increasing the 
attractiveness of legal 
work in comparison 
with alternative sources 
of income.
In 2004-07 a number 
of solutions were 
introduced aimed 
(directly or indirectly) at 
combating UDW.
In 2005 regulations 
concerning the employ-
ment of unemployed 
nannies, housekeepers 
and domestic help (...)46
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Poland 
(cont.)
UDW mainly occurs 
in gardening and 
agricultural works, 
neighbourhood services, 
refurbishments and 
repairs, and installation 
and refurbishment 
services.
The inﬂ  uence of the 
level of the minimum 
wage and its effect on 
the interest in UDW 
exists but is quite 
limited. 
(...) increased taxes on 
honest tax payers. 
(...) were introduced 
on the basis of the 
activation contract. 
In practice the op-
portunity was not taken 
up by tax payers on a 
visible scale for a variety 
of reasons, the adminis-
trative burden being one 
of them.
To reduce burdens 
connected with social 
insurance in 2005 an 
improvement was 
introduced for persons 
who become self-em-
ployed. During the ﬁ  rst 
24 months from when 
the economic activity 
started, the basis of 
assessment for insur-
ance fees is reduced to 
30% of the minimum 
wage. 
In the area of UDW the 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy 
develops projects 
of legal regulations, 
monitors the activity 
of employmentagen-
cies, and runs informa-
tive campaigns on 
the dangers that can 
be encountered while 
undertaking UDW. 
Since 2004 there have 
been no signiﬁ  cant 
actions to change the 
personal income
 tax system and/or 
reduce the remaining
 burden on wages. 
Recently, in April 2007, 
the government passed 
an amendment of the 
Act on the Reduction of 
the Disability Pension 
Fee (from 13% to 10% 
gross pay from1 July 
2007 and from 10% 
to 6% from 1 January 
2008).
The amendment of the 
Act on personal income 
tax (2006) could lead to 
an increase in UDW as it 
introduces changes in 
the regulation of self-
employment. 
It met with criticism 
from entrepreneurs 
and tax law specialists 
because it infringes the 
rules of freedom 
of economic activity 
and leads to the 
reduction of self-
employment. 
The growth of illegal 
employment could be 
the effect of the above 
changes.47
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Portugal UDW had a high 
political proﬁ  le a few 
years ago, but there is 
less interest in it now, 
with other concerns 
(e.g. recession and 
unemployment) being 
more prominent. UDW 
is not a central issue in 
the National Employ-
ment Plan for 2005-08, 
although measures are 
planned to tackle UDW 
and illegal work.
Concrete data on the 
prevalence of UDW are 
not available. Estimates 
of the proportion of 
GDP accounted for 
by UDW are between 
15% and 37%. There 
is no reliable evidence 
about relative changes 
in prevalence of UDW 
since 2004. 
The minimum wage 
in Portugal has, over 
recent years, declined in 
value relative to average 
wages. There are how-
ever plans to increase 
it, up to 2011. There 
are concerns (especially 
from employers’ organi-
sations) that increases 
may act as an incentive 
for UDW, encouraged by 
poor enforcement.
Overall, it can be argued 
that the low level of the 
minimum wage, and its 
limited coverage, mean 
that it probably has 
little impact on UDW. 
If the increases in its 
value are monitored as 
planned, it is likely that 
it will continue to have 
little impact on UDW.
The corporate income 
tax rate was reduced 
in 2005 (from 30% 
to 25%) and con-
trol measures were 
strengthened. It is not 
possible to identify if 
the reduction in the rate 
led to any reduction in 
UDW. 
The tax regime for 
self-employed people 
is likely to provide an 
incentive for UDW. 
Firms with low turnover 
beneﬁ  t from a simpli-
ﬁ  ed tax system and a 
low rate of 20%. It is 
concluded that this has 
decreased UDW.
The stricter controls 
on larger ﬁ  rms suggest 
that UDW is not used 
by them.
It is not possible to 
identify if the social 
security regime impacts 
on UDW. The rate of 
contributions paid by 
employers is seen by 
them as high, which 
may suggest it acts as 
an incentive for UDW. 
However, employers are 
aware that inspection 
and control measures 
have been increasing 
in recent years. 
Some employers do 
avoid social security 
contributions by 
legally paying workers 
for services, rather than 
employing them on 
contracts. 
The government (from 
2005) has paid close 
attention to problems 
relating to immigration. 
It has produced incen-
tives for immigrants to 
participate in regular, 
declared work. 
The government pub-
lished proposals in 2006 
to introduce elements 
of ﬂ  exicurity to the 
labour market, although 
these do not address 
UDW speciﬁ  cally. 
There are reforms under 
way of the social secu-
rity regime, although 
there is no speciﬁ  c link 
between this and UDW. 
The focus of the re-
forms is on the sustain-
ability of the regime. 
Several measures have 
been introduced which 
may have an impact on 
the prevalence of UDW. 
They include steps to 
simplify the creation of 
new ﬁ  rms, and incen-
tives for unemployed 
people to participate 
in regular work rather 
than UDW.
Other measures have 
aimed at strengthen-
ing the inspection and 
control of the tax and 
social security regimes 
(e.g. including steps to 
combat under-declara-
tion of income).  
Romania UDW has always been 
high on the political 
agenda.  However, eco-
nomic growth in recent 
years has brought UDW 
(as deﬁ  ned by the EC) 
in particular to the fore, 
and prompted measures 
to tackle it. 
UDW features promi-
nently in Romania’s 
National Reform Pro-
gramme, although there 
are no ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures to 
quantify its prevalence 
or to assess the impact 
of measures intended to 
reduce it.
Current estimates 
of the prevalence of 
UDW range from 16% 
to 21% share of GDP.  
The conclusion, from 
analysis of available 
data, is that the preva-
lence of UDW has (...)
The minimum wage in 
Romania has been re-
garded as an important 
tool to tackle UDW. 
Social partners agreed 
a minimum wage which 
may be above the 
statutory (government 
assigned) level. This is 
regarded as helpful in 
reducing incentives for 
UDW.
It is not argued that 
the minimum wage 
increases the incentives 
for UDW.
The government 
introduced a ﬂ  at rate 
(of 16%) income tax 
regime in 2005. This 
has been one factor 
(among many) likely 
to have contributed 
to the growth of the 
economy. However, 
no proper evaluations 
or assessments have 
been carried out of the 
actual impact of the ﬂ  at 
rate income tax regime 
on the prevalence of 
UDW and therefore no 
ﬁ  nal conclusions about 
impact can be drawn. 
Given the complexities 
of factors that lead to 
UDW, such a measure 
does not constitute a 
panacea in combating 
UDW. 
Contribution levels have 
been steadily decreas-
ing since 2003, but (as 
noted) in the absence of 
proper evaluation and 
assessments, the impact 
of the social security re-
gime on the prevalence 
of UDW is inconclusive. 
One argument is that 
optimal thresholds have 
now been reached and 
further reduction in 
contribution rates may 
backﬁ  re.
The Lisbon Strategy in 
2005 coincided with 
the government’s 
introduction of a ﬂ  at 
rate income tax. This, 
and steady reductions 
in social security con-
tribution levels, are pre-
sented in the National 
Reform Programme as 
key measures capable of 
tackling UDW. However, 
no evaluation of the im-
pact of these measures 
has been undertaken.
The minimum wage 
is also seen as a key 
tool in tackling UDW. 
A recent measure by 
the social partners is to 
introduce a higher mini-
mum wage for workers 
with high educational 
attainment.  This is ex-
pected to tackle under-
declaration of (...)48
 
 
￿
 
 
E
E
O
 
R
e
v
i
e
w
:
 
S
p
r
i
n
g
 
 
2
0
0
7
 
￿
Country Prevalence of 
undeclared work 
(UDW)
Role of minimum 
wages
Role of taxation regime Role of social security 
regime
Strategies and 
measures towards 
combating undeclared 
work
Romania 
(cont.)
(...) remained constant, 
although evidence 
might be a little contra-
dictory.
(...) incomes for 
better educated 
employees, especially 
prevalent amongst 
SMEs (educated 
employees were 
ofﬁ  cially paid at 
the minimum wage, 
with an additional 
but undeclared wage). 
Information campaigns 
have also been used to 
tackle UDW. 
The National Tax 
Collection Ofﬁ  ce runs 
a campaign to warn 
against UDW. 
The British Embassy 
ran a campaign to 
highlight the dangers of 
illegal migration 
or work in the UK.
Flexicurity is new
to the agenda in 
Romania.
Slovenia There is no ofﬁ  cial 
measure of UDW. 
Estimates vary widely, 
from 7-24%. UDW is 
mostly widespread 
in the construction, 
catering and trade 
sectors.
The gradual abolition 
of the payroll tax is 
under way to increase 
the attractiveness of 
work. Personal income 
tax rates are diminished 
across the board and 
progression is reduced 
by also reducing the 
number of tax brackets.
A national social 
protection programme 
was adopted in 
2006 to increase 
the attractiveness of 
work and motivate 
unemployed people to 
actively look for work 
and accept occasional 
and temporary 
employment.
UDW is not a major 
political priority. 
A law to deﬁ  ne and 
tackle UDW was 
adopted in 2000 
and amended in 
2006 to regulate 
many forms of non-
standard employment 
and encourage 
the declaration of 
economic activity.  
A commission was 
set up in 1997 to 
co-ordinate activities 
of many agencies 
involved in tackling 
UDW. 
The competences 
of inspectorates 
have been enhanced 
to enable them to 
issue administrative 
measures and ﬁ  nes. 
Joint inspections 
between several 
agencies are 
undertaken. 
Action is needed to 
create more reliable 
estimates of UDW, 
enhance the efﬁ  ciency 
of the judicial system 
in collecting ﬁ  nes, 
undertake a public 
awareness raising 
campaign, improve 
the capacity of 
inspectorates 
and introduce 
sanctions for people 
caught undertaking 
UDW. 49
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Slovakia A law was adopted in 
2005 to deﬁ  ne and 
regulate UDW. At the 
same time, crucial 
labour market reforms, 
the introduction of a 
ﬂ  at income tax, and 
simpliﬁ  cation of the 
business environment 
boosted the creation 
of formal jobs and 
increased incentives 
to declare activity. 
A massive inspection 
campaign and sizeable 
media attention further 
raised awareness of 
UDW. Since, 2004, UDW 
has been moderately 
decreasing (to around 
7%).
Administrative increases 
of the minimum wage 
beyond labour produc-
tivity growth result in 
increased labour costs. 
This may threaten jobs 
particularly in small, 
ﬁ  rms and low-paid sec-
tors, and encourage the 
emergence of UDW.
Since 2004, all corporate 
and individual income 
is taxed at a ﬂ  at 19% 
rate. Most of the tax 
exceptions have been 
abolished, and income 
taxation has decreased 
for almost every taxpay-
er. This had a positive 
effect on people’s deci-
sion to work formally. 
The opportunity for tax 
fraud and tax evasion 
has decreased. Incen-
tives to move income 
to a lower tax base have 
been weakened.
Motivation to employ 
at low/minimum wage 
is still present due to 
high social security 
costs. High payroll taxes 
are among the main 
impediments to regular-
ising UDW. Social insur-
ance contributions are 
amongst the highest in 
the OECD countries. The 
system is complicated. 
Social contributions are 
levied on the income 
from employment, as 
opposed to taxes, which 
are imposed on all types 
of income. This opens 
ways to minimise or 
avoid social security 
payments. Due to high 
marginal taxation, 
disincentives to work 
exist mainly for groups 
at the bottom of the 
wage scale.
UDW is not a major 
political priority, due to 
a widespread tolerance 
of informal activities in 
society. However, it is 
receiving increased at-
tention from the policy 
makers. 
Preventive measures 
consist of the creation 
of a favourable legal and 
administrative environ-
ment, strengthening of 
incentives and removing 
disincentives to declare 
work on both supply 
and demand sides. 
Administrative rules 
on business start-ups 
were simpliﬁ  ed, certain 
tax incentives adopted 
and the tax wedge 
decreased. 
Enforcement activities 
consist of the adoption 
of a special law on 
UDW, strengthening 
surveillance and the ap-
plication of appropriate 
sanctions. 
Services have also been 
actively provided to 
support ﬁ  rms/workers 
in transition to declared 
work. 
Action is needed to sim-
plify and harmonise the 
tax, social insurance and 
social beneﬁ  t regimes to 
decrease the tax burden 
and remove existing 
disincentives to work 
mainly for low-paid 
workers. 
Finland Estimates of the grey 
economy’s share of 
Finnish GDP vary from 
slightly below 5% to 
almost 18% depending 
on the method of 
calculating. In addi-
tion to foregone tax 
revenues (EUR 2 billion 
per year approx) the 
grey economy causes 
signiﬁ  cant indirect 
losses to enterprises 
as a consequence of 
the weakening of their 
competitiveness. With 
the opening of borders 
and increase in immi-
gration, there have been 
greater opportunities 
for domestic and foreign 
organised crime to ex-
pand into business and 
other social circles. Key 
problem sectors (...) 
No statutory minimum 
wage in Finland
The time spent working 
in Finland ranks among 
the lowest in the OECD 
countries. Perhaps the 
reason for the low 
amount of working 
hours is that there is a 
lot of unemployment 
and a lack of incentives 
to work since taxation 
is high, social security 
is generous and public 
services are free. Finnish 
consumers belong to a 
group of Nordic welfare 
states with a high 
income tax burden but 
they also belong to the 
group of countries with 
lower purchasing power.
Social security in 
Finland is relatively gen-
erous and this acts as a 
disincentive to work.
Work incentives are a 
problem especially with 
regard to low income 
jobs. Work incentive 
problems have increased 
given the increased 
prevalence of atypi-
cal job relationships. 
When the income level 
of part-time and ﬁ  xed-
term jobs is about 20% 
below that of full-time 
jobs, the effects of the 
labour incentive mea-
sures for eliminating 
income traps have been 
smaller in reality. 
A key way of combat-
ing the grey economy 
and ﬁ  nancial crimes in 
Finland is cooperation 
between authorities 
(VIRKE project). 
The enhancing of 
cooperation between 
tax authorities, police 
and customs has gained 
importance in accounts 
and investigations. 
The government has 
implemented four 
programmes combating 
the grey economy and 
ﬁ  nancial crime. 
A working group 
called ULTEVA – 2 was 
formed comprising 
central government and 
labour market organisa-
tions. The objective was 
to monitor the adher-
ence to collective (...) 50
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Finland 
(cont.)
(...) are construction and 
restaurants. In addition, 
transport, shipyards, 
cleaning as well as 
eastern trade are also 
problem sectors. 
(...) labour agreements 
particularly with respect 
to foreign temporary 
workers.  Several laws 
combating the grey 
economy have been 
drafted including:
construction site em- • 
ployees are required 
to have an obligatory 
personal ID
the appointment of  • 
representatives to 
supervise the beneﬁ  ts 
of workers coming 
from abroad in busi-
nesses using foreign 
labour
the domestic labour  • 
responsibility for 
the use of its foreign 
labour and adherence 
to labour agreement 
laws.
A goal of tax policy 
is to combat the grey 
economy and a range 
of speciﬁ  c measures are 
under consideration.
During 1996-2006 
the smallest reservation 
wages were lowered 
by taxation and 
expense policy mea-
sures by about 30%. 
Preconditions for 
employed older low-
income workers have 
been improved by the 
introduction last year of 
a temporary low-wage 
support measure. 
The amount of tax 
deductibility of 
housework has also 
been increased and 
also expanded to 
cover caretaking 
services in addition 
to renovation work.
Sweden The Swedish Tax Agency 
published a study of 
UDW in December 
2006 and found that 
the extent of UDW in 
Sweden is 5% of GDP. 
UDW has increased in 
the past decade – in 
1997, 11% of the 18-74 
age groups undertook 
some form of UDW; 
in 2006 the ﬁ  gure was 
13%.  The majority of 
workers involved in 
UDW are male, young 
(including students) and 
are  skilled craft workers 
or small business (...)
No minimum wage in 
Sweden.
Tax avoidance appears 
to be the most cited 
reason for undertaking 
UDW (as reported in the 
2006 Tax Agency study). 
This is the motive cited 
mostly by men, the self-
employed and the well 
educated. 
The study also suggests 
that high levels of 
taxation prompt 
workers to undertake 
UDW. Doing so is 
generally regarded as a 
‘minor offence’, with a 
perception that there
is little chance of (...)
A Tax Agency report 
in 2007 recommends 
a lower rate of social 
security contributions 
(20%, rather than 32%) 
for employers who 
are private individuals. 
This reﬂ  ects the 
generally held view in 
Sweden that relatively 
high social security 
contributions have been 
acting as an incentive 
for UDW.
Tackling UDW is a 
high priority for the 
Swedish Government 
and several initiatives 
have been implemented. 
Efforts have been 
made to raise the 
social awareness of 
UDW through joint 
information campaigns 
by the tax authorities 
and the Economic Crime 
Authority; some were 
undertaken with the 
social partners (e.g. in 
the construction sector). 
The Swedish Tax Agency 
was given additional (...)51
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Sweden (cont.) (...) owners (including 
self-employed).  UDW 
is highest in agriculture 
and ﬁ  shing, catering, 
taxis, car repairs, and 
personal and household 
services. UDW is 
also more prevalent 
amongst those on low 
incomes and amongst 
the employed (i.e. 
unemployed people are 
less involved in UDW). 
(...) being caught. 
It is generally accepted 
in Sweden that high 
taxation levels have 
restricted the growth 
of the personal services 
sector – affecting both 
the demand for such 
services, as well as their 
provision. This is likely 
to be having an impact 
on labour market 
gender equality.
A 2007 Tax Agency 
report recommends 
several changes to tax 
legislation, including: 
tax allowances if the 
employer is a private 
person; income from 
work between parents 
and children to be tax 
free; and income from 
work should not affect 
student loans.
The report also 
recommended 
increased control 
procedures, especially 
in the construction 
sector.
 (...) resources (staff) 
in 2006 and 2007 to 
introduce increased tax 
controls and audits.
In the ‘high risk’ sectors 
of restaurants and 
hairdressers, employers 
have been required 
from 1 January 2007 
to keep staff registers. 
Construction sector 
social partners are 
in agreement with 
introducing this 
requirement. 
A tax deduction for 
household services 
is being introduced 
from 1 July 2007. This 
is expected to shift 
the balance of work 
in household services 
from UDW to regular, 
declared work.
The Government has 
recently stated that 
it will introduce a 
measure to tackle 
UDW in the taxi 
industry. It will also 
decrease social security 
contributions in some 
service sectors (those 
in which UDW is most 
prevalent).
United 
Kingdom
Nothing new to 
quantify assessments 
of UDW. Evidence from 
2004 Review showed 
the incidence of UDW 
with be low in the UK 
compared with most 
Member States. 
To date it is not clear 
that the National Mini-
mum Wage (NMW) 
has had any signiﬁ  cant 
impact (either positive 
or negative) on infor-
mal work. Should the 
NMW begin to have a 
detrimental effect on 
the availability of jobs 
in low paid sectors/
occupations, it is more 
likely that individuals 
will turn to paid infor-
mal work. 
The low tax envi-
ronment should if 
anything reduce the 
incentive not to declare 
work. Tax credits also 
provide support for 
those on low incomes. 
The tax credits system 
however creates a dis-
incentive for a second 
earner in a family to 
work formally. Many 
people are not aware 
they are eligible for tax 
credits. The increase in 
the overall tax burden 
over the past decade 
is problematic for 
both businesses and 
individuals. There are 
two important issues 
for businesses – the 
complexity of the tax 
regime and the large 
scale of indirect tax 
losses. 
The design of social 
security payments 
creates adverse incen-
tives for individuals to 
stay on beneﬁ  ts rather 
than ﬁ  nd employment. 
There is a limit on the 
amount of work that 
can be undertaken 
while on beneﬁ  ts and 
the earnings disregard 
is also very strict. This 
forces people either 
to work fewer hours 
than they could or to 
take up informal work 
as well. The fact that 
formal employment 
especially for those on 
a low income is becom-
ing increasingly tem-
porary and unreliable is 
not always an incentive 
to leave beneﬁ  t.
ALMPs contained in 
various New Deal 
initiatives provide 
substantial support for 
the unemployed 
to enter formal work 
and actions have 
recently attempted 
to disrupt informal 
work by conducting 
work force interviews 
at unpredictable times 
and at short notice.
Immigration has been 
linked to increased 
rates of informal work. 
Immigrant workers are 
more likely to work 
in sectors in which 
informal work is
more prevalent such 
as agriculture and 
construction. 
The Department for 
Work and Pensions 
and HM Revenue 
and Customs take 
predominantly punitive 
measures to reduce 
informal work 
when linked to 
beneﬁ  t fraud and tax 
evasion, through pros-
ecution. New Deal for 
Communities (...)52
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United 
Kingdom 
(cont.)
(...) works closely with 
communities to tackle 
worklessness and 
increase paid employ-
ment (but does not 
directly target the 
informal economy). 
DWP has run several 
high proﬁ  le campaigns 
aiming to deter fraudu-
lent beneﬁ  t claims.
There are some regional 
and sub-regional pilot 
projects aiming to help 
people to legitimise 
their work activity. 
Working Tax Credit is 
an important in-work 
beneﬁ  t that should en-
courage people to take 
up formal employment. European Commission
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